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CASENOTES
TAXATION-Rental Payments to a Corporate Trustee Follow-
ing the Simultaneous Gift and Leaseback of Business Property
Are Not Deductible as Ordinary and Necessary Business Ex-
penses. Perry v. United States, 520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1975).
The transfer of income-producing property to a Clifford trust' generally
has allowed the taxpayer in a high tax bracket to divert income and his
federal tax liability to lower bracketed beneficiaries while retaining rever-
sionary control over the property. 2 The effectiveness of the device depends
upon complete income shifting which, in the case of investment property, is
accomplished simply by gift of the property to an independent trustee.
Thereafter, income produced by that property is taxed either to the trust or
to the beneficiaries.3 When business property which the taxpayer must
occupy for his normal livelihood is involved, however, the device is effective
only to the extent that the taxpayer can deduct, as a business expense, the
rental payments made pursuant to a leaseback of the property from the
trustee.
4
The gift-leaseback 5 has become a relatively risky method of income-
1. Designation as a Clifford trust indicates that the trust grantor has retained a
reversionary interest in the trust corpus and that the trust duration and terms comply
with sections 671-78 of the Internal Revenue Code. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-
78.
2. See Simmons, The Use of Trusts in Tax Planning for the Professional, 50 TAXES
420 (1972); Smith, Shifting Income Within the Family Group, 30 TAXES 995 (1952)
("A graduated income tax such as ours breeds devices for shifting income." Id.). See
generally H. HARRIS, FAMILY ESTATE PLANNING GUIDE (1971).
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-78. There is a critical distinction between
transferring property which produces income and transferring or assigning the right to
receive such income, even though such a right may be considered "property" in other
contexts. Compare Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1973) (gift of beneficial
ownership of productive trust property shifts tax liability) with Helvering v. Horst, 311
U.S. 112 (1940) (gift of interest coupons detached from negotiable bonds does not shift
tax liability).
4. For an excellent analysis of the rent deductibility issue, see Oliver, Income Tax
Aspects of Gifts and Leasebacks of Business Property in Trust, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 21
(1965).
5. The financial aspects of transfer-leasebacks have been widely discussed. See, e.g.,
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splitting in the last decade, however, as courts have increasingly scrutinized
the degree of independence granted to the trustee and have required that the
gift-leaseback, as a whole, serve some ostensible "business purpose"6 before
deduction of rental payments will be allowed under section 162(a) (3) of the
Internal Revenue Code.7  This business purpose requirement essentially
conflicts with the obvious purpose of most Clifford trusts and has discour-
aged the gift-leaseback of business property. In Perry v. United States,8
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently
suggested that a showing of trustee independence at the time of leaseback as
well as during the trust term, in conjunction with valid trust and lease
instruments, may justify rental deductions under section 162(a)(3). Plan-
ners should be able to create the factual circumstances suggested by Perry
and thereby decrease the risk of income-splitting by the gift-leaseback
of rental property.
The taxpayers in Perry were two physicians who, in 1963, constructed
their medical clinic on land owned in common.9 Their partnership was
thereafter the sole occupant of the building. In 1968, each partner trans-
ferred his one-half interest to a corporate trustee, a bank, in favor of his
children and retained a reversionary interest effective upon trust terminafion.
Simultaneously, each taxpayer leased back the transferred interest at the
Cary, Current Tax Problems in Sale, or Gift, and Lease-Back Transactions, N.Y.U. 9TH
INST. ON FED. TAX. 959 (1951); Gold, Trust and Leaseback, 40 A.B.A.J. 714 (1954);
Note, The Use of Business Property as Short-Term Trust Corpus, 19 VAND. L. REV. 811
(1966).
6. See, e.g., I.L. Van Zandt, 40 T.C. 824, 831 (1963), aff'd, 341 F.2d 440 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965). One commentator has suggested that inconsis-
tency in the case law has rendered the gift-leaseback nothing more than a gamble.
H. HARRIS, supra note 2, § 145. Nevertheless, the gamble may be required when the tax-
payer's major asset is business property.
7. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162 provides in part:
(a) In General.
There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary ex-
penses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business, including-
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the
continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of
property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or
in which he has no equity.
8. 520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 782 (1976).
9. 376 F. Supp. 15, 16 (E.D.N.C. 1974). Because so many of the gift-leaseback
cases involve physicians, these trusts are often called "doctor trusts." See Lemann, The
"Doctor Trust": Principles for Successful Planning that Emerge from Analysis of the
Cases, 2 ESTATE PLANNING 2 (1974), which also provides the basic fact patterns and
results of several related cases.
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reasonable rental of $200 per month. The lease periods coincided with the
duration of the trusts. 10 During the 1969 tax year, the partnership paid the
trustee the $4,800 rent required by the leases and deducted that amount
from gross income. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed that
deduction and assessed additional taxes." Upon payment of the deficiencies,
the taxpayers brought refund suits in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina.
The government admitted the validity of the Clifford trusts and the
reasonableness of the rents but contended that the gift-leasebacks had no
tax consequences because they were sham transactions serving no business
purpose. 12  The government argued that the voluntary creation of such
arrangements could not result in necessary business expenses within the
meaning of section 162(a) (3).13 The taxpayers, on the other hand, relied on
a literal interpretation of section 162(a)(3). Following a valid gift of the
building to an independent corporate trustee, the taxpayers argued, satisfac-
tion of the rental obligations was a necessary condition to the continued
occupancy of the premises. 14 In granting the taxpayers' motion for summary
judgment, 15 the district court stressed the independence of the corporate
trustee and the enforceable rental obligation assumed by the taxpayers.
Presumably encouraged by remarkable success in recent gift-leaseback
cases,' 6 the government appealed.
10. 376 F. Supp. at 16. Dr. Perry had created a 10-year trust while Dr. Medders had
created a 14-year trust.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 18. The government's admissions merely focused the inquiry on the
deductibility issue and did not significantly weaken or alter the government's main
arguments.
13. The government argued alternatively that the reversionary interests constituted
retained equity for which contributions were not deductible. Id. See notes 59-61 &
accompanying text infra.
14. 376 F. Supp. at 18. The ostensible distinction between the government's and
taxpayers' contentions, therefore, was at which point in time "necessary" should be
determined: prior to the gift-leaseback as a whole, or subsequent to the gift but prior to
the lease.
15. Id. at 16. Each party had moved for summary disposition following stipulation
of the facts.
16. There appear to have been seven cases directly on point since 1968, all won by
the government. While some of the cases represent examples of obvious taxpayer
blunders, other cases underscore the necessity of careful drafting. Mathews v. Commis-
sioner, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975); Wiles v. Commissioner, 491 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir.
1974), aff'g mem. 59 T.C. 289 (1972); Duffy v. Commissioner, 487 F.2d 282 (6th Cir.
1973); Audano v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970); Chace v. United States,
422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970); Robert F. Zumstein, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 198 (1973);
Sidney W. Penn, 51 T.C. 144 (1968). See Lemann, supra note 9, at 6.
[Vol. 25:634
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The Fourth Circuit reversed after observing that the grantors had trans-
ferred previously owned property to trusts, had leased those interests back-
thus creating rental obligations when none had previously existed-and had
retained reversionary interests. Although state law had vested in the trustee
"virtually every right, privilege and incident of ownership enjoyed by the
grantor," 17 the court found the bank's independence as trustee "illusory"
since the original lease had irrevocably committed the entire corpus to the
grantors on terms which the grantors had arranged prior to the actual creation
of the trusts.' The court concluded that the lack of trustee indepen-
dence necessarily meant -that the obligations to pay rent had not "result[ed]
from a transaction with a real business purpose." 19  Hence, such payments
could not be deducted as ordinary and necessary business expenses under
section 162(a)(3).
The court reached its conclusion by finding that the grantors had so
controlled the entire arrangement that they, in effect, precluded the trustee
from the exercise of fiduciary independence. This article will examine the
basis of that finding and whether or not trustee independence should be the
test for deductibility of rental payments following the leaseback of business
property given to a bank in trust.
I. FACTORS AFFECTING DEDUCTIBILITY OF RENTAL PAYMENTS
FOLLOWING THE GIFT-LEASEBACK
The use of trust devices for splitting income among family members seems
to have gone unchallenged until the late 1930's, when the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue began taxing "transferred" income to the grantor rather
than to the trust or its beneficiaries. 20  The first court challenge to the
Commissioner's position appears to have been brought by a grantor who
transferred securities to himself as trustee for his wife. 2' In Helvering v.
Clifford,22 the Supreme Court found that "the short [fiveyear] duration of
17. 376 F. Supp. at 17 n.1. The North Carolina statute, incorporated by reference
into the trust agreement, vests 30 affirmative powers of management in the trustee upon
transfer of legal title. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 32-26, 32-27 (1965).
18. 520 F.2d at 238.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465 (1935).
21. The ease with which the income tax laws could be circumvented by these and
other devices had become well-recognized. See Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on
Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); Paul, The Background of the
Revenue Act of 1937, 5 U. Cm. L. REv. 41 (1937).
22. 309 U.S. 331 (1940). For a discussion of the immediate impact of Clifford, see
Ray, The Income Tax on Short Term and Revocable Trusts, 53 HARv. L. REV. 1322
(1940).
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the trust, the fact that the wife was the beneficiary, and the retention of
control over the corpus by [the grantor] all lead irresistibly to the conclusion
that [the grantor] continued to be the owner for [tax] purposes .. ".. ,,2 The
grantor, as owner of the securities, was therefore taxable on the income.
Although the primary factor in the decision was the "dominion and control"
retained by the grantor over the property, the Court failed to establish any
ascertainable criteria for determining what degree of retained control consti-
tuted ownership for tax purposes.
The Treasury Department attempted to clarify the uncertainty generated
by the Clifford decision with its promulgation of the Clifford Regulations in
1945.24 While Clifford had correlated the taxability of trust income with
the degree of control over the property retained by the grantor, the regula-
tions addressed the ancillary issue of trustee independence. Under relatively
precise guidelines, trust income generally was taxable to the grantor if the
corpus or income rights could revert to the grantor within 10 years of trust
creation, if the beneficial ownership of the corpus was subject to the
grantor's power of disposition, or if ,the corpus was subject to any exercise of
discretion for the individual benefit of the grantor.25 Determination of trust
validity for tax purposes thus became focused on the independent exercise of
fiduciary responsibility. Congress enacted these regulations almost verbatim
as sections 671 through 678 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.26
While compliance with the regulations or their successor Code sections
has assured the benefits of income-splitting to grantors of investment proper-
ty, the additional requirement of deductibility under section 162(a)(3) has
always faced grantors of business property. Nevertheless, in the first four
cases in which the government moved against the gift-leaseback, 27 the
23. 309 U.S. at 335.
24. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-21 (1945), T.D. 5488, 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 19. The
regulations drew the lines which the Clifford opinion had indicated were drawable. As
one might imagine, the promulgation of such regulations by the executive branch
received mixed reviews. See Eisenstein, The Clifford Regulations and the Heavenly City
of Legislative Intention, 2 TAx L. REv. 327 (1947); Pavenstedt, The Treasury Legislates:
The Distortion of the Clifford Rule, 2 TAx L. REV. 7 (1946); Note, The Gift and
Leaseback: A New Tax Avoidance Gimmick, 59 YALE L.J. 1529 (1950).
25. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-21(b) (1945), T.D. 5488, 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 19.
One case held that drawing the durational line at 10 years was unconstitutionally
arbitrary and unreasonable and deprived taxpayers of property without a required
hearing. Commissioner v. Clark, 202 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1953).
26. T. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-78.
27. Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814
(1950), rev'g 12 T.C. 1095 (1949); Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.
1948), rev'g 8 T.C. 415 (1947); John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956); Albert T. Felix, 21
T.C. 794 (1954). Following reversal of its first two decisions, the Tax Court seemed
more willing to approve the Potter and Felix arrangements.
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taxpayers prevailed on the ground that valid trusts and legally binding leases
had been created. For example, in Skemp v. Commissioner,28 the grantor
had created a 20-year nonreversionary trust of his office building and had
leased the building back from the bank trustee for a 10-year term with a 10-
year renewal option. The Seventh Circuit found that rental payments made
pursuant to an enforceable lease obligation were indeed "ordinary and
necessary" expenses "required to be made as a condition to the continued
use or possession [of the premises], for purposes of trade or business
"29 The government's arguments in these early cases paralleled the
"dominion and control" argument which had succeeded in the Clifford attack
upon trust validity. But upon findings of trust validity in accordance with
the regulations or sections 671 through 678, the earlier courts concluded that
rental payments made pursuant to valid leases were deductible.
The Tax Commissioner was not content to view the gift to trust and
subsequent leaseback as separate transactions. In Hall v. United States,30
the Commissioner argued that "economic reality" should govern the tax
consequences of the arrangement: the substance of the arrangement-
apparently the income split-should determine the necessity, and hence the
deductibility, of the rental payments. 3 1  While the United States District
Court for the Northern District of New York agreed with this argument,
several significant "economic realities" created by the gift-leaseback were
disregarded. Trust beneficiaries normally have available a panoply of
contract and tort remedies against nonproductive trustees.3 2  The annual
land tax bill, usually payable by the trustee as legal owner, is economically
real. Inter vivos trust giving is also recognized for estate and gift tax
purposes.3 3 Perhaps most important, the grantor-lessee's continued nonpay-
ment of rent could result in a summons for summary possession dutifully
filed by the fiduciary in the local landlord-tenant court. Nevertheless, the
questionable technical accuracy of the economic reality argument is not its
major strength. Rather, the argument impels a court to view the gift-
leaseback from an overall, detached vantage point, from which the inconsis-
28. 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948), rev'g 8 T.C. 415 (1947).
29. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) (3). The partial text of that section is set out
in note 7 supra.
30. 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962).
31. Id. at 586-88.
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 197-226A (1959); ScoTr, TRusTs §§
197-226 (3d ed. 1967).
33. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, H9 2106, 2511. See also Gutman, Minimizing
Estate Taxes: The Effects of Inter Vivos Giving, N.Y.U. 33D INST. ON FED. TAX. 131
(1975); Horvitz, How the Nature of Trust Property Can Kill the Gift Tax Exclusion,
113 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 490 (1974).
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tency between the motivation behind the gift-leaseback and any normal
definition of deductibility is clearly observable.
3 4
Although the economic reality argument prevailed in Hall, the Commis-
sioner was apparently not convinced of its continued validity and took the
next opportunity to bolster the attack against rental deductions. In Van
Zandt v. Commissioner,35 the grantor had transferred his business property
to himself as trustee, reserving the reversionary interest, and had leased it
back for the 10-year trust duration. Dr. Van Zandt's position was striking-
ly similar to that of the original Clifford grantor except that he had satisfied
the technical requirements of duration and trustee independence established
by the Clifford provisions of the Code .3  Although the position was so
tenuous that one commentator was able to explain the case only as "an
attempt to test the outer limits" of deductibility,3 7 the case nevertheless
allowed the Commissioner to expand his argument. Before the Tax Court,
the government not only advanced the economic reality theory, but also
argued that rental payments, made pursuant to a gift-leaseback lacking
overall business purpose, were not necessary expenses within the meaning
of section 162(a). 38  Noting that the issue was only the deductibility of rent
payments as distinct from the taxability of the trust, Judge Dawson agreed
with both contentions: the gift-leaseback had neither economic reality nor
business purposes. 39
34. In Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966), Justice Stewart, writing for a
unanimous Court, characterized the "ordinary and necessary" requirements of deductibil-
ity:
Our decisions have consistently construed the term "necessary" as imposing
only the minimal requirement that the expense be "appropriate and helpful"
for "the development of the [taxpayer's] business." . . . The principal func-
tion of the term "ordinary" in § 162(a) is to clarify the distinction, often diffi-
cult, between those expenses that are currently deductible and those that are
in the nature of capital expenditures ...
Id. at 689. While the trust grantors' rental payments meet the "ordinary" requirement,
the controversy stems from whether or not they are also "necessary." Under the view
adopted in Hall, the taxpayers' gifts were not "necessary" since they were not helpful
for the development of the business. But since the taxpayers were not trying to
deduct the value of the gift, application of the "necessary" standard to the gift in trust
would seem inappropriate. Moreover, the validity of a gift and its tax effects are not
normally judged by such a standard. See Note, supra note 5, at 819.
35. 40 T.C. 824 (1963), aff'd, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814
(1965).
36. 341 F.2d at 441.
37. Lemann, supra note 9, at 4. That author considered it "hard to imagine any set
of facts more favorable to the Commissioner." Id.
38. 40 T.C. at 830-31. See note 34 supra.
39. Id. at 829-3 1.
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit closely examined the role of the trustee in this
arrangement and concluded that this trustee was not independent since "[tjhe
whole principal amount of the trust was irrevocably committed to the
possession of the grantor the moment the trust was created."'40 The lack of
trustee independence compelled the court to adopt the "overall" approach
established as an incident of Hall. Viewing the gift-leaseback as a single
transaction, the court concluded that the obligation to pay rent had not
arisen as an ordinary and necessary incident of business since the arrange-
ment had effected no ostensible business purpose.
The Fifth Circuit specifically indicated that Van Zandt was not a case of
an independent trust, which would be accorded full tax effect, since
trustees of independent trusts, unlike the trustee in this case, were
"required to handle the affairs of the trust under -the strict principles of a
fiduciary in the management of the property. '41 It was not clear, however,
whether similar analysis could ever be applied to a bank trusteeship. Five
months after the Fifth Circuit had affirmed Judge Dawson's Van Zandt opin-
ion, he answered the question negatively.
In Alden B. Oakes,42 the grantor leased the entire trust corpus from the
bank trustee two days after execution of the trust agreement which had
conveyed the property to the trustee. Originally retaining a reversionary
interest, the taxpayer had assigned that interest to his wife during the first of
the three tax years in question. The Tax Court found that a bank as trustee
created sufficient trust independence to warrant disregard of the lack of
business purpose. 43  Indeed, Judge Dawson believed that, "[w]here, as
here, a grantor gives business property to a valid irrevocable trust over which
he retains no control and then leases it back, it is not necessary for us to
inquire as to whether there was a business reason for making the gift.
Admittedly there was none."'44  The court further asserted that the test of
business necessity should be applied only to the circumstances existing after
the gift in trust had occurred. Significantly, the government did not appeal,
possibly because of the deference traditionally accorded corporate trustees,
or perhaps because the government wished to preclude the Tax Court's
reasoning from becoming appellate precedent. 'In any event, the govern-
40. 341 F.2d at 443. Such a commitment occurs upon execution of the lease
agreement which, as a technical matter, must follow conveyance of the property. into
trust since the trustee must possess the fee before a leasehold interest can be carved out.
41. Id.
42. 44 T.C. 524 (1965).
43. Id. at 529-32.
44. Id. at 532.
19761
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ment's failure to appeal seemed to indicate that naming a bank as trustee
would save a grantor-taxpayer from application of the Van Zandt rule. 45
II. ACTUAL TRUSTEE INDEPENDENCE: THE SINE QUA NON
OF DEDUCTIBILITY
The procedural certainty flowing from the tax planner's recognition of the
Van Zandt-Oakes distinction was relatively short-lived. In Perry, the Fourth
Circuit pierced the shield of the Oakes bank trustee by finding Van Zandt
applicable to the bank trusteeship. The court began its analysis by compar-
ing the fact situation of Van Zandt to that of the Perry arrangement. In
each instance, the court noted, grantors had owned the building prior to its
conveyance in trust, free of any rent obligation. Following the gift-lease-
backs, the occupancy and use of both premises continued unchanged while
obligations had been created whose only apparent purpose was to divert tax
liability from the grantors to their children. Because of the similar effects of
the arrangements on the grantors, the court mechanically adhered to the
result obtained in Van Zandt.46
The Van Zandt court had been careful, however, to search for business
purpose only after a finding that the trustee lacked independence. The lack
of independence, of itself, did not render the rental payments nondeductible.
The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, truncated that approach by equating
the "contemporaneous" leaseback with lack of business purpose. Upon
finding the trustee's independence "illusory," the court immediately conclud-
ed "that the taxpayers' obligations to pay rent to the bank did not result from
a transaction with a real business purpose. '47 The clear implication of this
rationale is that trustee independence somehow indicates or imparts a
business purpose to the arrangement sufficient to sustain rent deductions.
This result reveals the fallacy of shortening the Fifth Circuit's approach.
While some courts have suggested that an independent trustee is indicative of
the legal validity of a transaction, no court has ever related trustee indepen-
dence directly to the grantor's motivation in creating or funding the trust.
Indeed, the primary function of trustee independence under these circum-
stances is not to cloak an otherwise personal transaction with business
purpose; rather, it is to protect the beneficiary interests by assuring objective
management of the trust property. The Perry court confused the subjective
45. In Wiles v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 289, 300 (1972), aff'd mem., 491 F.2d 1406
(5th Cir. 1974), the Tax Court applied this distinction. The grantor-trustee's retained
control was sufficient to sustain the Commissioner only after the court had specifically
noted that the grantor had failed to name a bank as trustee.




intention of the grantors with the objective performance of the fiduciary
duties owed by the corporate, chartered trustee.
This confusion is the direct result of the interpretation given to the scope
of the Code's Clifford provisions by -the Perry court and by most courts
which have passed on the rent deduction issue. The Senate report accompa-
nying the 1954 Code indicated that the Clifford provisions were not intended
to govern the deductibility of payments to trusts under transfer-leaseback
arrangements. 48  While no such language can be found in the House
report, 49 courts have uniformly construed the Senate report to mean that the
statutory trustee independence standards governing the taxability of trusts as
separate entities do not apply to the degree of trustee independence neces-
sary to sustain rent deductions under gift-leasebacks. 0 The Clifford provi-
sions and their predecessor regulations 5' had been intended to clarify the
trustee independence standards first enumerated by Justice Douglas in
Clifford, but courts have disregarded those statutory guidelines when busi-
ness property rather than investment property provides the trust funding.52
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit did recognize the factual difference
between a grantor as trustee and a bank as trustee. The court consciously
refrained from directly questioning the bank's performance as trustee by
observing that the amount of rental payments and other lease conditions had
been arranged by the grantors and that the lease, so arranged, had conveyed
the entire trust corpus to the grantors for the trust duration. Therefore, the
court concluded that "[tihere was literally no area in which the broad
powers vested in the bank as trustee could operate.153  To the extent that
the lease terms could be arranged unilaterally by the grantors, that assertion
48. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 365 (1954). According to the Senate
report, the Clifford provisions were to govern only the separate taxability of trusts and
were to have "no application in determining the right of a grantor to deductions for
payments to a trust under a transfer and leaseback arrangement." Id.
49. H.R. REp. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A212 (1954).
50. See Perry v. United States, 520 F.2d 235, 237 n.2 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 782 (1976); Sidney W. Penn, 51 T.C. 144, 150 (1973). However, an inter-
pretation of the Senate's intent as applying to sale-leasebacks would seem more con-
sistent with the equitable concept of section 162(a)(3). Under that view, the Senate
could have been providing the flexibility needed to distinguish between true sale-
leasebacks and mere mortgages whose "rental payments" consisted partly of payments
for principal which increased equity. Had the Senate sought merely to prohibit
deductions for payments which increased a mortgagor's equity, then the rent deductions
under a true gift-leaseback, in which payments did not affect an owner's equity, would
be governed by the trustee independence standards of sections 671 through 678 and a
literal reading of section 162(a)(3). For further development of this point, see Oliver,
supra note 4, at 35-39.
51. See p. 638 supra.
52. See, e.g., Sidney W. Penn, 51 T.C. 144, 150 (1973).
53. 520 F.2d at 238.
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would seem true; when the grantor names himself as trustee, the assertion is
indisputable. But when a bank is involved, the court's finding necessarily
implies that the bank, as lessor, merely agreed with the grantors' "pre-
arranged" leases regardless of their impact on beneficiary interests which the
bank, as trustee, is under a duty to protect.
The assertion in this context is difficult to reconcile with the proper
functioning of a fiduciary since the traditional role of a fiduciary becomes
convoluted under a gift-leaseback. Normal analysis of fiduciary perform-
ance focuses on trustee efforts to obtain maximum economic return on the
trust property while maintaining a reasonable degree of safety. Under the
gift-leaseback, however, not only is the receipt of rental payments relatively
assured by the grantor's desire to divert predictable income, but the grantor
is also willing to pay, indeed desirous of paying, the highest rent possible
without becoming vulnerable to a "grossly excessive" attack. 54 For these
reasons, the court's difficulty in refraining from attacking trustee indepen-
dence directly is understandable. But it is also clear that trustee indepen-
dence alone provides a questionable measure for determining the deductibil-
ity of rent payments.
Having decided to follow Van Zandt regardless of the different trustee
identities, the court distinguished Skemp on the same grounds which the
Fifth Circuit had advanced in Van Zandt. First, Skemp had been decided
on a bifurcated basis-the individual validities of the trust and rental
obligation being determinative-while the Fourth Circuit preferred an overall
approach requiring "real business purpose." 55 This distinction is consistent
with the rationale of Van Zandt, since the taxpayer there could possibly
have prevailed upon an adequate showing of business purpose. But the
court's abbreviated reasoning in Perry does not admit to a showing of
business purpose even if the trustee lacked independence. The court gave
no indication that business purpose would somehow become material were
the trustee found to be independent. Thus, rather than focusing on the
arrangement as a whole, the court simply shifted the emphasis from the
individual elements of the gift-leaseback to the single issue of trustee inde-
54. The fact that rental payments for equipment worth $8,000 to $10,000 totaled
$58,000 over five years ("grossly excessive") was one factor in a Fifth Circuit decision
that a trust-leaseback device was an economic nullity for tax purposes. Audano v.
United States, 428 F.2d 251, 257-59 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'g 69-1 U.S. TAx. CAS. 9354
(N.D. Tex. 1969). While the Audano court construed excessive rentals as indicative of
economic nullity, only that amount found to exceed fair rental value will likely be
disallowed when both parties are business entities. See, e.g., Sparks Nuggett, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 458 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
55. 520 F.2d at 239.
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pendence. The existence or nonexistence of business purpose was irrelevant to
the court's analysis and therefore provides a questionable basis for distinction.
The second manner in which Skemp was distinguished was based on the
Van Zandt court's statement that the grantor in Skemp had transferred more
property in trust than was subsequently leased back. 56 While that assertion is
supported by neither the Tax Court nor the Seventh Circuit Skemp opinions,5 7
the court quoted Van Zandt to the effect that a valid business purpose could
be discerned in conveying investment property-the remainder of the building
not physically occupied by the grantor-to the trustee "'for management and
payment of income to beneficiaries, since the whole income did not come
from the grantor.' "5 However, tax law never requires business purpose for
making a valid gift of investment property. It seems unusual that a court
would find business purpose where none is required and probably none
exists. Moreover, as mentioned above, any business purpose which may
have motivated this leaseback would not have affected the result, since lack
of trustee independence, not lack of business purpose, had been the critical
element.
The final basis for distinguishing Skemp was that the grantor in Skemp
had retained no reversionary interest.59 Although the court indicated that
the retention of such an interest was inconsistent with valid business purpose,
the basis for relating the reversionary interest to business purpose is unclear.
The court may have been responding to the government's argument that the
reversionary interest constitutes a "retained equity" for which payments are
not deductible under section 162(a)(3).60 The district court in Perry
responded to that contention by noting that the rental payments were made
only to assure the continued use of the property and not to enlarge the
grantors' share of ownership. While the Fourth Circuit disagreed, the basis
of the disagreement was not addressed in the appellate opinion. The
argument does have some merit, however. The future interest has ascertain-
able present value, and, as one commentator has pointed out, the present
value of the reversionary interest increases steadily during the trust term
until, at termination, the present value of the reversion equals the current
56. Id., citing 341 F.2d at 442.
57. Both Skemp opinions indicate that Dr. Skemp had leased back the entire premises
under a 10-year lease with a 10-year renewal option, thus matching the 20-year trust
term. See 8 T.C. at 418; 168 F.2d at 599.
58. 520 F.2d at 239, quoting 341 F.2d at 442. The mere transfer of the managerial
burden for personal purposes would seem an equally implicit reason for such a convey-
ance.
59. 520 F.2d at 239.
60. The first successful use of this argument seems to have occurred in Hall v. United
States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962), in which the district court relied on it as an
alternative basis for disallowing the rent deduction. And the taxpayer in Alden B.
1976]
Catholic University Law Review
market value of the property." Although the rental payments do happen to
coincide with an increase in the present value, neither the amount nor the
fact of increase is contingent upon any tenant's rental payments. Neverthe-
less, although the Fourth Circuit did not rely on the retained equity theory, it
appears likely that the government will continue to make this argument.
The Commissioner may also be able to fashion an argument from the
court's observation that the instant arrangement provided relative certainty
of the diversion of set amounts of income throughout the applicable peri-
ods. 62 Rather than suggesting that a gambling atmosphere is more condu-
cive to financial arrangements than minimization of risk, the court was
perhaps suggesting that a complementary relationship existed between the
grantors' certainty of income diversion and the independence exercisable by
the trustee. This rationale is consistent with the court's original analysis of
trustee independence, and indicates that lease terms might substantially
influence a future court's determination of trustee independence.
In Perry, the original lease conveyed the leasehold interest at a fixed
rental throughout the trust term. Thus, no future rent negotiations could
occur and the trustee could exercise no discretion over new tenants or
alternate uses of the property. Subsequent to the original lease, no "broad
powers of management vested in the bank as trustee could operate. ' '6 3
Notwithstanding the original lease terms, however, the bank as trustee in fact
had assumed the role of lessor for the original lease and thus had performed
its fiduciary duty to make the corpus productive. 4  Any question in that
context would concern fiduciary performance, not fiduciary independence.
Of course, a trustee is able to exercise independence more frequently and
Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965), was saved from disallowal after the court found that his
assignment of the reversionary interest had terminated his equity. The Oakes court
specifically noted, however, that a reversionary interest constituted an "equity" within
the meaning of section 162(a)(3). 44 T.C. at 531. However, the more likely
explanation of the "equity" language is that Congress meant to prohibit deduction of
mortgagors' contributions to principal. See note 50 supra; 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FED.
INCOME TAX § 25-108 (rev. ed. 1972). See also Rev. Rul. 25, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 283.
61. See Oliver, supra note 4, at 36. The author extensively analyzes the retained
equity argument, concluding that the argument reaches beyond congressional intent. Id.
at 35-39. But cf. Chace v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 513, 516 (M.D. Fla. 1969), aft'd,
422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970).
62. 520 F.2d at 239. The court made this observation in distinguishing two cases
advanced by the taxpayers: Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972), and
Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950).
Indeed, soon after Brown had been decided, one commentator warned that leasing back
for the entire trust duration was unsafe since the trustee exercised so little independence
both at the time of leaseback and subsequently. See Cary, supra note 5, at 974.
63. 520 F.2d at 238.
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 181 (1959); G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 681 (2d ed. 1960); 2 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 181 (2d ed. 1959).
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convincingly if the original lease term does not extend to the full trust term
and the trustee's independence at future rent negotiations is not restricted. 65
Moreover, negotiation of the original lease subsequent to trust creation
would provide a further indication of trustee independence. 6
III. CONCLUSION
By extending the Van Zandt analysis to a situation for which it was not
intended, the Fourth Circuit has assumed that individual grantors might
preempt the state statutory powers given a fiducial trustee. A result
predicated on that assumption conflicts with the deference traditionally
accorded the independence of a corporate fiduciary. The most dis-
heartening aspect of the Perry result, however, is the injection of an
unnecessary element of uncertainty into a tax planning atmosphere in
which certainty had previously prevailed. Planners are no longer safe in
relying on the independence of the corporate trustee but must now them-
selves create a situation, in form, to camouflage the obvious substance of the
gift-leaseback. Specifically, the grantor must return to the bank a few days
after the trust deed is executed, agree to a rental amount ideally based on
appraisal, and sign the trustee's 1-year form lease after striking any renewal
option language. Yearly thereafter, the taxpayer repeats the process of
"negotiating" rent and executing a new lease agreement.
In the absence of ambiguous statutory language or congressional intent to
the contrary, the court's focus on trustee independence which has satisfied
the only applicable legislative requirements sharpens the wholly judicial
distinction between investment and business property as vehicles for income-
splitting -through Clifford trusts. Nevertheless, attention by tax planners to
the details surrounding the leaseback from the corporate trustee should
insulate the grantor of business property from effective challenge.
James D. Walker
65. In Robert v. Zumstein, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 198 (1973), the Commissioner
prevailed because the lease agreement gave the grantor-lessee the option to renew from
year to year with rent set at the previous year's amount in the event of dispute. An even
more egregious situation exists when the renewal options are included in a pretrust
agreement. The Fifth Circuit has recently rendered -the obvious result to that arrange-
ment. See Mathews v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975).
66. Although the Oakes lease was entered into two days after execution of the trust
deed, the Tax Court relied on the inherent independence of the bank rather than the
intervening period. The gap between trust creation and leaseback, however, would
logically preclude the independence issue and focus the inquiry upon the fiduciary's
performance. Indeed, the Perry court specifically relied on the "simultaneous" nature of
the arrangement.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-District Attorney is Under an
Implied Statutory Duty to Inform Grand Jury of Exculpatory
Evidence. Johnson v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d
792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975).
Historically, the fifth amendment's guarantee that an individual shall not
face a criminal charge of committing "a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . ... -1 has been
hailed as necessary to provide "a protective bulwark standing solidly be-
tween the ordinary citizen and an overzealous prosecutor."'2 Despite this
assertion, the practices of many public prosecutors have led several judges
and commentators to conclude that the grand jury of today serves at -the
pleasure of the public prosecutor and no longer insulates the citizenry from
prosecutorial abuse. 3  The decision in Johnson v. Superior Court4 has
lessened the potential for prosecutorial abuse by placing an affirmative
duty on a district attorney to inform the grand jury of exculpatory evidence
in the possession of the prosecution. Johnson appears to be the only
decision of a state's highest tribunal which places such a duty on the
prosecution in a grand jury proceeding-a stage in the criminal process
which does not afford an accused many of the procedural guarantees
provided in an adversary proceeding.5
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). Courts have long recognized
that the proper and historic role of the grand jury is to stand between an accused and
indiscriminate federal prosecution. See, e.g., Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218
(1960); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 485 (1951); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 59 (1906); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1887); In re Tyler, 64 Cal. 434, 1 P.
884, 887 (1884).
3. "Any experienced prosecutor will admit that he can indict anybody at any time
for almost anything before any grand jury." Address by Chief Judge William J.
Campbell, Conference of Metropolitan Chief District Judges of the Federal Judicial
Center, reprinted in 55 F.R.D. 229, 253 (1972). See also L. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY:
THE USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL POWER (1975); 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
6.02(1)(b) (2d ed. 1975) (grand jury basically serves as a law enforcement agency);
Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153 (1965);
Conyers, Grand Juries: The American Inquisition, RAMPARTS, Aug./Sep. 1975, at
14; Goodell, Where Did the Grand Jury Go?, HARPER'S, May 1973, at 14. But see
Lumbard, The Criminal Justice Revolution and the Grand Jury, 39 N.Y.S.B.J. 397, 400
(1967); Scigliano, The Grand Jury, The Information, and the Judicial Inquiry, 38 ORE.
L. REV. 303, 310 (1959); Sharp, Grand Juries: An Investigative Force, TRIAL, Jan./Feb.
1973, at 10, 27.
4. 15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975).
5. Telephone interview with Kevin Corrington, Deputy Attorney General of Califor-
nia, in Washington, D.C., Dec. 16, 1975.
Rulings of the Supreme Court permit grand juries to consider evidence which would be
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In Johnson, the petitioner sought a writ of prohibition 6 to restrain the trial
court from proceeding to trial upon his indictment. Prior to the charge
contained in the indictment alleging violations of California drug laws,7
Johnson has been arrested on charges of selling and possessing dangerous
drugs. At a pretrial conference on the earlier charge, Johnson was informed
by a deputy district attorney that a local jail sentence rather than a harsher
state prison term would be recommended if Johnson provided information
about narcotic dealers. The probation and sentence hearing was continued
and during this period petitioner was under pressure to either produce
information or face a harsher sentence.8 Subsequently, Johnson agreed to
sell dangerous drugs to two undercover agents through a Mr. Sherman. After
Sherman made arrangements with the agents to transact the sale in their
hotel room, Sherman and Johnson drove to the hotel in separate cars.
Sherman went to the agents' room while Johnson remained outside. When
the transaction was completed, Johnson and Sherman were arrested. The
district attorney elected to seek prosecution by information and filed a
complaint seeking a preliminary hearing.9  Johnson testified about his
prior deal with -the deputy district attorney and stated that his objective in
participating in the transaction was to inform on all the parties involved. The
magistrate did not find the requisite "sufficient cause" to hold Johnson for
trial and dismissed the charges against him.10 The district attorney then
inadmissible at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (illegally
seized evidence); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (hearsay). California
law recognizes the grand jury as a nonadjudicative proceeding. See, e.g., People v.
Foster, 198 Cal. 112, 243 P. 667, 670 (1926) (no right to produce witnesses in one's own
behalf); People v. Dale, 79 Cal. App. 2d 370, 179 P.2d 870, 873 (Ct. App. 1947) (no
right to be represented by counsel).
6. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 999a (West 1970) (petition for writ of prohibition based
upon the ground that the indictment was found to be without reasonable or probable
cause). Johnson alleged that the district attorney's withholding of exculpatory evidence
denied him due process and violated a statute requiring production of explanatory evi-
dence. Id. § 939.7 (West 1970), quoted note 15 infra.
7. The indictment charged Johnson with conspiracy to commit and commission of
the crime of transporting and selling amphetamine tablets in violation of CAL. HEALTH &
SAF. CODE § 11352 (West 1975), and CAL. PEN. CODE § 182 (West 1970).
8. 15 Cal. 3d at 252, 539 P.2d at 794, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
9. States are not bound by the fifth amendment's command that a grand jury
indictment is the sole means by which an individual is charged with a serious crime.
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). California permits a prosecutor to seek
prosecution "by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, or by
indictment ...... CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 8. See CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 737-38 (West
1970).
10. 15 Cal. 3d at 252, 539 P.2d at 794-95, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 34-35. CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 871 (West 1970) provides in relevant part: "If, after hearing the proofs, it appears
• . . that there is not sufficient cause to believe defendant guilty . . . the magistrate
must order the defendant to be discharged .... "
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sought to prosecute Johnson under the same charges by seeking a grand jury
indictment." The district attorney did not reveal to the grand jury John-
son's exculpatory testimony before the magistrate. The grand jury subse-
quently returned an indictment.
The court of appeal issued a writ of prohibition on constitutional
grounds,' 2 finding that the prosecutor knew that the transcript of the
accused's prior testimony was available and admissible as evidence and that
such evidence would be material and, if believed, would provide an explana-
tion of Johnson's trip to the scene of the transaction as well as a basis for the
belief "that he was an informer rather than Sherman's co-conspirator or
accomplice.' 1 3  Omitting such evidence manipulated the grand jury to the
point of depriving Johnson of his constitutional right to an indepen-
dent grand jury finding of sufficient cause.' 4 While the court discussed the
relevant statute' 5 as an example of the grand jury's "receptivity to evidence
of innocence as well as guilt,"' 6 the court's holding was clearly based on
the ground that the nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence violated petitioner's
right to due process.
The Supreme Court of California granted the government's petition for
hearing, thus vacating and nullifying the opinion of the court of appeal.' 7 The
11. The California prosecutor is free to seek another prosecution for the same offense
despite a magistrate's previous dismissal of the complaint. See, e.g., People v. Uhle-
mann, 9 Cal. 3d 662, 511 P.2d 609, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1973) (dismissal of indictment
is not a bar to another prosecution for same offense, either by seeking grand jury
indictment or another information).
12. Johnson v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 977, 113 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Ct. App.
1974), vacated, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975).
13. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 991, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
14. Id. The court reasoned that in order for the grand jury to perform its central
function as the independent adjudicator of probable cause, the prosecutor's duty must
extend beyond "avoidance of suppression" and include an affirmative obligation to
produce evidence which tends to negate guilt. The court did not cite any precedent
which places such a due process obligation on a prosecutor. Instead it focused on rulings
in other areas relating to prosecutorial behavior and the need for an independent and
unbiased grand jury. Id. at 747-49.
15. CAL. PEN. CODE § 939.7 (West 1970), which formed the basis for the later
opinion of the state supreme court, provides:
The grand jury is not required to hear evidence for the defendant, but it shall
weigh all the evidence submitted to it, and when it has reason to believe that
other evidence within its reach will explain away the charge, it shall order the
evidence to be produced, and for that purpose may require the district attorney
to issue process for the witnesses.
16. 38 Cal. App. 3d at 987, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
17. Once a case is transferred to the supreme court for a hearing, the court of
appeal's "opinion and decision are of no more effect . . . than if they had not been
written." Knouse v. Nimocks, 8 Cal. 2d 482, 483-84, 66 P.2d 438, 438-39 (1937), cited
in People v. Hopkins, 44 Cal. App. 3d 669, 678, 119 Cal. Rptr. 61, 66 (Ct. App. 1975).
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court did not consider Johnson's due process argument but instead chose to
dispose of the case in his favor on statutory grounds. The court held that
section 939.7 of the California Penal Code' places an implied duty on a dis-
trict attorney to inform the grand jury of the nature and existence of evidence
reasonably tending to negate guilt. 19 The court rejected the government's
argument that the plain meaning of the statute places the exclusive burden to
order the disclosure of exculpatory evidence on the grand jury. 20 The court
reasoned that the grand jury's capacity under section 939.7 to order evidence
"within its reach [which] will explain away the charge" would be thwarted
unless the district attorney brought exculpatory evidence to the attention of
the grand jury. 21 Otherwise, "the [grand] jury is unlikely to learn of it"
and compel its production pursuant to the statute. 22  Justice Mosk, joined by
Chief Justice Wright, issued a lengthy concurring opinion which termed the
majority holding "a mere analgesic to ease the procedural pain" when there
is a "need for substantive corrective surgery."' 23 The surgery favored by
18. CAL. PEN. CODE § 939.7 (West 1970), quoted note 15 supra.
19. 15 Cal. 3d at 255, 539 P.2d at 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
20. The government, after discussing authorities which interpreted section 939.7 as
being applicable to the duties of the grand jury, argued that the statute
does not delineate any duty, expressly or impliedly, on the part of the district
attorney to submit to the grand jury anything more than a prima facie case
unless, the grand jury having reason to believe, on its own motion, that ex-
culpatory evidence exists, the district attorney is ordered by the grand jury to
produce such evidence.
Real Party in Interest's Petition for Hearing at 20, Johnson v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d
248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975).
California case law recognizes the principle that a penal code section is interpreted by
first examining it to determine whether the section's language is ambiguous. If the
language is clear on its face, "the provision is to be applied according to its terms without
further judicial construction." Morse v. Municipal Court, 13 Cal. 3d 149, 156, 529 P.2d
46, 49, 118 Cal. Rptr. 14, 18 (1974). If the language is ambiguous on its face, the court
must consult legislative history and provide a construction based on the purpose indicated
by the history. 529 P.2d at 50. In Johnson, the court did not address itself to this plain
meaning rule nor were there any references to the legislative history of section 939.7
which justified the court's interpretation.
21. 15 Cal. 3d at 254, 539 P.2d at 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
22. Id. at 255, 539 P.2d at 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
23. Id., 539 P.2d at 797, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 37. It should be noted that Justice Mosk's
opinion relates solely to an indicting grand jury which determines whether there is
probable cause that a specific suspect committed an offense. It does not challenge the
"valuable and productive role" of an investigating grand jury which does not immediately
focus on a particular individual, but rather uses its subpoena power to investigate
whether a crime has been committed, usually in the areas of government corruption and
organized crime. See 15 Cal. 3d at 256 n.1, 539 P.2d at 797 n.1, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 37
n.l. For a discussion of the investigatory and indictment functions of a grand jury, see
Note, American Grand Jury: Investigatory and Indictment Powers, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
136 (1973).
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Justice Mosk is a rule which permits "every indicted defendant a post-
indictment preliminary hearing as a matter of right."'24  Such a rule,
according to Justice Mosk, is needed to counter the existing grand jury
proceeding which raises "the spectre of the Star Chamber" and denies
indicted persons equal protection and due process of law.25
I. ROLE OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
Johnson can be expected to affect significantly -the behavior of a prosecu-
tor at the pretrial stage of the criminal process because it works against the
government's control of the evidence submitted to the grand jury. The
grand jury is greatly dependent upon the prosecutor for information, presen-
tation of evidence, and advice on legal and evidentiary problems. 26 Many
jurisdictions permit the prosecution to appear before the grand jury for the
purpose of advising it on matters pertaining to law and to its duties, 27 but
24. 15 Cal. 3d at 256, 539 P.2d at 797, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
25. Id. at 257, 262-67, 539 P.2d at 797, 801-05, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38, 41-45.
Justice Mosk outlined procedural guarantees afforded an accused faced with prosecu-
tion by information: preliminary hearing before a magistrate, representation by counsel,
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the opportunity to appear and to
present evidence. In contrast, he pointed out that the indictment process is characterized
by "its deliberate omission of even minimal safeguards": no right of an accused to ap-
pear, no right to have counsel present, no right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
Id. at 257, 539 P.2d at 797, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 37. A constitutional right to a postindict-
ment hearing providing procedural safeguards would remedy such a bald disparity. Id.
at 270, 539 P.2d at 806-07, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 46-47. For a discussion of the potential
significance of the concurring opinion, see note 65 infra.
26. The grand jurors "look to the prosecutor as 'their' lawyer, whose very decision to
accuse imparts momentum to the accusation." 113 Cal. Rptr. at 748, citing People v.
Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 966, 113 Cal. Rptr. 732 (Ct. App. 1974). See also
People v. Sears, 49 111. 2d 14, 273 N.E.2d 380 (1971) (proper channel for presenting
information to the grand jury is the state attorney). Both of the proposed Grand Jury
Reform Acts of 197.5 would permit a federal grand jury to request the appointment of a
special attorney in lieu of a government attorney to assist the grand jury in an inde-
pendent investigation and sign any indictment. H.R. 2986, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4(a),
4(b) (1975); H.R. 6006, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4(a), 4(b) (1975).
27. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 935 (West 1970) (prosecutor "may at all times
appear before the grand jury for the purpose of giving information or advice relative to
any matter cognizable by the grand jury .... "); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 905.19 (Supp.
1975) (prosecution shall attend session of grand jury and give legal advice about any
matter cognizable by jury); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 255.15 (1971) (duty of a district attorney
to give grand jury advice on any legal matter). But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-624
(1975), which declares the presiding judge to be the legal advisor of the grand jury.
North Carolina common law prevented the state solicitor from going into the grand jury
room during sessions of the grand jury, see State v. Crowder, 193 N.C. 130, 136 S.E. 337
(1927), but more recently it has been held that the solicitor's presence in the grand jury
room at a time when the jury is neither voting nor deliberating is insufficient by itself to




some jurisdictions prevent the prosecutor from appearing before the grand
jury when it is deliberating and voting. 28 The significant power of the
prosecutor to determine the depth and direction of evidence ordered by the
grand jury is recognized in the American Bar Association recommendation
that a prosecutor should disclose exculpatory evidence in his possession
during the grand jury inquiry.29
Although it appears that Johnson is the only authority for quashing an
indictment on the ground of nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence, there are
isolated holdings which suggest support for prosecutorial disclosure of facts
favorable to the accused. In one case, People v. Dumas,30 petitioner,
charged in an information with murder, was committed by a magistrate
following a hearing on his mental condition. A district attorney pursued
and obtained an indictment. Petitioner moved to examine the grand jury
minutes to see whether a letter written to the grand jury concerning his
commitment was thoroughly explained. While thecase can be distinguished
from Johnson on two points-it involved evidence mailed directly to the
grand jury, and Dumas' motion was to examine the grand jury minutes
rather than a motion to quash the indictment-the New York trial court held
that a prosecutor has the responsibility to explain the legal ramifications of
the commitment. The test applied by the court was whether the district
attorney failed to disclose information which might affect "the result."''1  In a
later Oklahoma case, Stone v. Hope,32 the charge by information against
petitioner for possession of marijuana was dismissed by the magistrate at a
28. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 905.17(2) (Supp. 1975) ("[n]o person shall be
present while the grand jurors are deliberating or voting"); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §
2939.10 (1975) (no one other than grand jurors to be present while they vote or express
views). Contra, Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 360 Mass. 188, 275 N.E.2d 33,
(1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972) (indictments not invalid when prosecutor's
presence and actions did not intimidate, coerce or influence grand jury).
29. The ABA recommendation states: "The prosecution should disclose to the grand
jury any evidence which he knows will tend to negate guilt." ABA PROJECT ON
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3.5(b) (relations
with grand jury) (1975). For a more general guideline on prosecutorial fairness, see
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 7-103 (1972).
30. 51 Misc. 2d 929, 274 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
31. The court, without citation to authority, apparently accepted the defendant's
argument that "the District Attorney's obligation would also seem to be to disclose
'favorable' evidence to a Grand Jury as to a trial Jury." Id. at 932, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 770.
Although this obligation was met here because the evidence was known to defense
counsel who communicated it to the Grand Jury in a letter, the court granted the motion
to examine so that defendant could determine whether the prosecution had met its duty
to explain the evidence favorable to the defendant. Id. at 932-33, 274 N.Y.S.2d at
770-71.
32. 488 P.2d 616 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
1976]
Catholic University Law Review
preliminary hearing. The district attorney then persuaded a grand jury to
return an indictment charging the same offense. The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals held that the previous dismissal of a complaint must be
disclosed to a grand jury considering the same charge. The court justified
such prosecutorial disclosure by recognizing the importance of a magistrate's
dismissal under Oklahoma law. 33
A prosecutor's failure to disclose the hearsay nature of the evidence
presented to a grand jury may result in the dismissal of an indictment. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ruled that a
prosecutor's sole reliance on hearsay evidence when firsthand testimony was
available, coupled with his failure to inform the grand jury of the hearsay
nature of the testimony, required dismissal of the resulting indictment.3 4 In
United States v. Estepa,35 the sole witness was a policeman whose knowl-
edge of the defendant's activities was "extremely limited."' 6 The witness
spoke to the grand jury at length and the prosecutor "did nothing to alert the
grand jury to any limitations on [the witness'] knowledge."'37  An undercov-
er patrolman, "the only person . . . who was in a position to inform the
grand jury of just what occurred up to the point of the arrest, '38 was not
called to testify. In dismissing the indictment, the court stated that "the
grand jury must not be 'misled into thinking it is getting eye-witness
testimony . . . whereas it is actually being given an account whose hearsay
nature is concealed . . . .' ,9 The rule in Estepa recognizes that grand
jurors often cannot be expected to know of the hearsay character of
testimony unless the prosecutor informs them of that character. A grand
jury informed of the hearsay character of the evidence would be less
persuaded to find probable cause than if such a disclosure were not made.
Thus it can be argued that the rule, in effect, places an affirmative duty on
the prosecution to disclose facts beneficial to the accused's side of the case.
However, the Second Circuit's rule appears not to be followed by other
33. Id. at 619-20. Under Oklahoma law, a magistrate's ruling on the sufficiency of
the evidence is "final and binding" on other determinations of sufficient cause unless the
prosecution presents additional evidence to the subsequent adjudicator of sufficient cause.
Id. at 619. For a discussion of Hope and an argument in favor of applying its rule to
subsequent decisions of the California Supreme Court, see pp. 662-63. in ra.
34. United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1134.
37. Id. at 1134-35.
38. Id. at 1134. The court was told that the undercover patrolman "was in the field
doing other work that day" and that there were no reasons why there could not have
been a short postponement for his presentation. Id.
39. Id. at 1136, quoting United States v. Leibowitz, 420 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1969).
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circuits40 and, in light of United States v. Calandra,41 would possibly be
disapproved if directly considered by the Supreme Court. In Calandra, the
Supreme Court ignored Estepa and steadfastly reaffirmed the broad rule of
Costello v. United States42 that there is no constitutional provision prescrib-
ing the kind of evidence upon which grand jurors must act.43
The absence of a duty upon the prosecution to disclose exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury in most jurisdictions is in sharp contrast to the
prosecution's duty to disclose certain information at trial. The Supreme
Court has held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favor-
able to an accused upon request violates due process when the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution. ' 44 Further expansion of a federal defendant's right
to discover the government's case against him is provided by the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Pursuant to Rule 16(c), a defendant is
permitted, upon request, to have access to any documents, photographs, or
other tangible objects which are material -to the defense or are intended to be
used by the prosecution as evidence at the trial.45  Under the Jencks Act,46
a defendant has the right for impeachment purposes to compel the prosecu-
tor to produce any statements by government witnesses made prior to trial
which relate to the subject matter of the witness' testimony. 47 Failure of the
government to produce such statements will force the trial judge to strike the
witness' testimony from the record or to declare a mistrial when required in
"the interests of justice."'48  In 1970, Congress enacted an important
amendment to the Jencks Act which placed grand jury testimony within the
40. See, e.g., United States v. Powers, 482 F.2d 941, 943 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 923 (1974); United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (Second Circuit's rule "serves simply as a supervisory
guideline to be employed by courts within their sound discretion . . . [and has] never
been considered, even by that circuit, as a constitutional requirement." 478 F.2d at
411).
41. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
42. 3.50 U.S. 359 (1956).
43. In affirming the rule in Costello, the Court stated:
mhe validity of an indictment is not affected by the character of the evidence
considered. Thus, an indictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge
on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incom-
petent evidence ....
414 U.S. at 344-45.
44. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
45. Internal reports, memoranda and other materials made by the government in
connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case are not subject to discovery.
FED. R. CiuM. P. 16(a)(2).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
47. Id. § 3500(b).
48. Id. § 3500(d).
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definition of "statements" subject to discovery under the Act. 49  Thus, a
government witness' testimony before a grand jury must be disclosed to a
defendant at trial upon request if -that witness is called upon to testify by the
government. A defendant would then have access to grand jury testimony
and therefore a better view of the propriety or impropriety of the grand jury
inquiry. Prosecutors can be expected to rely upon Costello and Calandra
for the purpose of avoiding the Jencks Act disclosure requirement by
securing an indictment through the use of hearsay testimony and then calling
upon non-grand jury witnesses to give firsthand testimony at trial.50 Dis-
closure of federal grand jury minutes for purposes other than impeachment
rests within the discretion of the court.
51
In California, "criminal discovery has been opened up to an unprecedent-
ed extent."'52  The California Supreme Court has ruled that there are
instances in which the prosecution must disclose favorable material evidence
despite the defendant's failure to request it.5 3  At trial, a defendant is entitled
to obtain government witness' statements made to law enforcement offi-
cers, 54 a transcript of the testimony before a grand jury inquiry,55 and the
names and addresses of government witnesses. 56 Even after Johnson, it is
49. Id. § 3500(e)(3) (1970) provides that the term "statement" as used for purposes
of identifying the types of discoverable statements means "a statement, however
taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any, made by said witness to a grand
jury."
50. A challenge to this procedure on the ground that it negates the purpose of section
3500(e)(3) was rejected in United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (government not required to develop potential Jencks Act
statements for defendant).
51. See FED. R. CRIM. P. (6) (e). The Supreme Court has held that such discretion
need be exercised only when the defendant has demonstrated a "particularized need" for
the material. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966); United States v.
Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958); cf. United States v. Whiteside, 391
F. Supp. 1385, 1388 (D. Del. 1975), which applied the "particularized need" test to
defendant's request for grand jury notes without mentioning 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(3).
52. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery in England, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 749, 757 (1964). See Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal
Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 228, 229 (1964).
53. See, e.g., In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 532, 487 P.2d 1234, 1239, 96 Cal. Rptr.
594, 599 (1971) ("mo condition the duty to disclose upon request would provide a trap
for the unwary and place substantial additional burdens on our busy trial courts.") Id.
54. See, e.g., People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956). Cf. Walker v.
Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d 134, 317 P.2d 130 (Ct. App. 1957), in which the
court prevented a sheriff from interfering with a defendant's right to interview witnesses.
.55. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 938.1 (West Supp. 1975).
56. See, e.g., People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 755, 349 P.2d 964, 3 Cal. Rptr. 148
(1960). California pretrial discovery does not rest on constitutional grounds, but is a
means by which the court promotes "the orderly ascertainment of truth." See generally
Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
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readily apparent that there remains a wide gap between the disclosure
obligation placed on a prosecutor before the grand jury and the disclosure
required at trial.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO GRAND JURY PROCEEDING
Justice Mosk's constitutional challenge to the grand jury's indicting func-
tion is a reaction to the fact that numerous procedural rights are afforded to
an accused faced with prosecution by information which are not afforded to
the suspect of a grand jury inquiry.57 Since the Supreme Court's decision in
Hurtado v. California,5" states have not been precluded from prosecuting by
using the information procedure. In Hurtado, the Court held that the fifth
amendment's guarantee that an individual shall not face a charge of
committing a serious crime without the return of a grand jury indictment
applies solely to federal prosecutions. As long as a state's prosecution by
information guards the substantial interest of the accused, the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment does not require a grand jury indict-
ment.59 Normally, such safeguards are abundantly provided when there is
prosecution by information. In California, an accused charged with an infor-
mation is entitled to a preliminary hearing before a magistrate, 60 representa-
tion by counsel,6 ' cross-examination of adverse witnesses,0 2 and a presenta-
tion of evidence tending to rebut allegations of sufficient cause. 63 On the
other hand, as one noted commentator concludes, "the grand jury continues as
a secret, ex parte inquiry guided by a predisposed prosecutor. The accused is
denied an opportunity to confront his accusers, to cross-examine them, or to
have the assistance of counsel." 64
Significantly, Justice Mosk's opinion may be acceptable to a majority of
the present members of the California Supreme Court.65  Nevertheless,
57. 15 Cal. 3d at 255, 539 P.2d at 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 37 (Mosk, J., concurring).
58. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
.59. Id. at 538.
60. CAL. PEN. CODE § 858 (West 1970).
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Jones v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 660, 483 P.2d 1241, 94 Cal. Rptr. 289
(1971); Alford v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 724, 105 Cal. Rptr. 713 (Ct. App.
1972); CAL. PEN. CODE § 865 (West 1970).
63. Jennings v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 2d 867, 428 P.2d 304, 59 Cal. Rptr. 440
(1967); CAL. PEN. CODE § 866 (West 1970).
64. Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stage?, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 807,
808 (1972). See Alexander & Portman, Grand Jury Indictment Versus Prosecution by
Information-An Equal Protection-Due Process Issue, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 997 (1974).
65. Justice Tobriner, in concurring with the majority holding, indicated his sympathy
with Justice Mosk's discussion of "the serious constitutional questions" raised by the
grand jury indictment, but withheld opinion on the merits of the constitutional claims
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despite the sharp contrast in safeguards afforded by the two procedures,
California courts have steadfastly refused to hold such a disparity a violation
of due process and equal protection of the law. 66
The concurring opinion of Justice Mosk relied upon Coleman v. Alabama67
and other decisions of the United States Supreme Court which provide for
procedural guarantees at noncriminal disciplinary proceedings. 6 In Cole-
man, a preliminary hearing to determine whether there was sufficient
evidence to bring an accused before a grand jury was deemed a "critical
stage" of the criminal process, which under the sixth amendment compels
states to provide the assistance of counsel. The Court ruled that a defend-
ant's potential harm of being indicted and facing trial warranted the presence
of counsel at a preliminary hearing in which counsel may "expose fatal
weaknesses in the State's case" through cross-examination and "more
effectively discover the case the State has against his client. . . ...1 The
Court did not mention the effect of the rule on a grand jury proceeding. The
question has been posed that if the preliminary hearing in Coleman is a
critical stage, "how can this be reconciled with the fact that the Constitution
itself does not permit the assistance of counsel at the decidedly more 'critical'
grand jury inquiry?" 70  Recent Supreme Court rulings extending procedural
guarantees to individuals facing noncriminal or disciplinary proceedings
suggest that a grand jury proceeding which may eventually lead to one's
incarceration should afford similar procedural rights.
71
until such issues were directly placed before the court. 15 Cal. 3d at 270, 539 P.2d at
807, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 47 (Tobriner, J., concurring). Justice Richardson, recently ap-
pointed to the supreme court, sat on the court of appeal when it decided Johnson on con-
stitutional grounds and concurred with the result of that opinion. 113 Cal. Rptr. at 751
(Richardson, J., concurring). It appears that the supreme court might cast three
(Justices Mosk, Wright and Tobriner) or possibly four (Justice Richardson) opinions for
deciding similar issues on constitutional grounds.
66. See, e.g., People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385
(1972), citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8 and Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884);
People v. Pearce, 8 Cal. App. 3d 984, 87 Cal. Rptr. 814 (Ct. App. 1970). Justice Mosk
concurred in Sirhan without opinion. 7 Cal. 3d at 755, 497 P.2d at 1151, 102 Cal. Rptr.
at 415 (Mosk, J., concurring).
67. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
68. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison disciplinary proceedings);
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (revocation of probation); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (revocation of parole).
69. 399 U.S. at 9. The Court also recognized that defense counsel might use the
preliminary hearing as an important impeachment tool at trial. Id.
70. Id. at 25 (Burger, J., dissenting).
71. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison disciplinary proceed-
ings); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation); Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (termination of state employment); Goldberg v. Kelly,
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The protections established in Coleman and other procedural guarantees
provided at a preliminary hearing may be avoided when a prosecutor elects
to seek a finding of probable cause before a grand jury rather than a
magistrate. A majority of jurisdictions allow district attorneys to avoid the
unpleasantness of having their case discovered and facing defense counsel by
permitting prosecution through the secret indicting process. 72  In People v.
Uhlemann,7a the California Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's failure
to prove a finding of sufficient cause at the preliminary hearing does not bar
his later success with the grand jury despite the grand jury's consideration of
uncontradicted testimony of government witnesses who had been totally
discredited at the preliminary hearing. Under these circumstances and those
in Johnson in which it appeared "obvious that the district attorney was
determined to initiate this prosecution in a forum that would preclude
petitioner from testifying in his own behalf," 74 a defendant would desire a
post-indictment hearing on the issue of probable cause. However, authorities
almost uniformly hold that an accused cannot demand a preliminary hearing
after indictment since the indictment makes conclusive the existence of
probable cause to hold the accused for trial.75  Oklahoma76 and Michigan
run counter to the general rule. In People v. Duncan,7 7 the Supreme Court
of Michigan, while noting that the disparity of procedural rights at the two
proceedings might raise serious questions of equal protection and due
process, stopped short of providing a postindictment hearing on constitutional
grounds. Instead, the court rested on its "inherent power" to grant a
post-indictment preliminary hearing as a matter of criminal procedure. 78
397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967) (right to counsel at post-indictment lineup).
72. For a list of state statutes which permit the prosecution to elect between the filing
of an information or indictment, see Dash, supra note 64, at 812 n.24.
73. 9 Cal. 3d 662, 511 P.2d 609, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1973). Johnson condoned the
practice of forum shopping by citing Uhlemann with approval. 15 Cal. 3d at 255, 539
P.2d at 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 36 (district attorney may continue to prosecute by seeking
another indictment or by filing another complaint).
74. 15 Cal. 3d at 268, 539 P.2d at 805, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 45 (Mosk, J., concurring).
75. "A post-indictment preliminary hearing would be an empty ritual, as the govern-
ment's burden of showing probable cause would be met merely by offering the indict-
ment." Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132, 133 (2d Cir. 1967). See United
States v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Heap, 345 F.2d 170
(2d Cir. 1965); Vincent v. United States, 337 F.2d 891 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 988 (1964); Barber v. United States, 142 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1944).
76. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 524 (1969).
77. 388 Mich. 489, 201 N.W.2d 629 (1972).
78. Id. at 502, 201 N.W.2d at 635. The court reasoned that although the grand jury
has the advantages of secrecy and the power to subpoena witnesses, in modern practice
its effective use appears to be limited due to the grand jury's heavy reliance on the
prosecutor for legal interpretations. Id. at 501, 201 N.W.2d at 634.
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III. Johnson: RADICAL RESPONSE OR STOPGAP APPROACH?
Through statutory construction, the California Supreme Court has made
mandatory the grand jury disclosure recommendation of the American Bar
Association by placing a new procedural burden on a prosecutor seeking an
indictment. 79 To successfully quash an indictment returned in violation of
Johnson, a defendant must show that during the grand jury inquiry there was
evidence known to the prosecution and concealed from the grand jury which,
if revealed to the grand jury, would reasonably tend to negate the guilt of the
accused.8 0 The court used section 939.7 of the California Penal Code as its
vehicle for increasing the independence of the grand jury and expanding the
prosecutor's prima facie case for a finding of probable cause. The court sought
to protect the accused and, in considering section 939.7, departed from its
stated principles of statutory interpretation.8' While the court avoided the
constitutional issues raised by the court of appeal and the concurring opinion
of Justice Mosk, it still managed to provide an accused with some additional
protection from prosecutorial abuse. Johnson emphasizes the difference be-
tween the district attorney's duty at trial, "where the adversary system oper-
ates" to compel the disclosure of substantial material evidence favorable to the
defendant, 82 and the ex parte grand jury proceeding. The grand jury's
power under section 939.7 to order the production of exculpatory evidence
"within its reach" would be illusory unless the grand jury is informed of such
evidence. Thus the protection afforded by Johnson fits into a pattern of
79. Legislation pending before Congress would also mandate the ABA recommenda-
tion by requiring the district court before which a grand jury is impaneled to dismiss any
indictment if it finds that the federal prosecutor "has not presented to the grand jury all
exculpatory evidence in his possession." H.R. 6006, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 7(3)
(1975); H.R. 2986, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 5(3) (1975).
80. The Criminal Division of California's Office of the Attorney General interprets
Johnson as imposing a prosecutorial duty of disclosure of exculpatory evidence, but
not a duty of seeking out, producing, or presenting such evidence, unless the
grand jury requests that such evidence be produced after disclosure of its exist-
ence and nature by the prosecutor.
Memorandum from Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General for California,
Criminal Division, to all California District Attorneys, Sep. 24, 1975.
81. See note 20 supra. Whether other jurisdictions follow Johnson will greatly
depend on judicial interpretations of statutory counterparts to section 939.7. The
statutes of many jurisdictions are in language almost identical to that of section 939.7.
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-1106 (1948); IOWA CODE ANN. § 771.15 (1950); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-19-4 (1953). But see S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 23-30-12 (1967) (grand
jury's request for exculpatory evidence must be made "by and with the consent of the
state's attorney"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 335 (1969) (grand jury must hear
exculpatory evidence upon request of the accused).
82. 15 Cal. 3d at 255, 539 P.2d at 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
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judicial and statutory expansion of an accused's right to ample discovery of
the government's case, 83 access to grand jury minutes,8 4 and in California,
an indictment not based solely on hearsay testimony.8 5 Johnson seems to be
a logical extension of the Second Circuit's ruling in Estepa which prevents
the prosecutor from misleading the grand jury by not disclosing the hearsay
nature of the grand jury testimony. In both Estepa and Johnson, some
disclosure on behalf of the accused was necessary to negate the unchallenged
presentation to the grand jury.
Nevertheless, while Johnson provides a new measure of protection, the
points raised by Justice Mosk as to the sufficiency of the majority opinion
remain unanswered. Since the Court's decision in Hurtado,8s an increasing
number of states, including California, have allowed their prosecutors to
elect between prosecuting by information or indictment. The disparity
in the degree of procedural rights afforded at each proceeding was ignored
by the majority and emphasized by Justice Mosk. Such a disparity, particu-
larly after Coleman, raises questions about whether measures adopted by the
majority adequately protect an accused from prosecutorial abuse.
First, an accused must depend upon a prosecutor's perspective of what
information contained in the preparation of a state's case is exculpatory.
Factual disputes will arise over what evidence was in the possession of the
prosecutor, whether that evidence was exculpatory, and the means by which
such evidence was disclosed to the grand jury. Such debates between those
arguing the Johnson rule and those distinguishing Johnson on its facts is well
illustrated by Fasanaro v. Superior Court,8 7 the first post-Johnson case
83. See notes 44, 45, 53, 54, 56 & accompanying text supra.
84. See notes 49, 55 & accompanying text supra.
85. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 939.6(b) (West 1970).
86. See notes 58, 59 & accompanying text supra.
87. Civil No. 36843 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Oct. 30, 1975). In Fasanaro, the prosecutor
initially failed to have a 12-member grand jury return an indictment charging the accused
with bribery and conspiracy. The grand jury was reconvened with two additional
members and instructed not to consider any of the evidence submitted at the first
proceeding. The prosecution proceeded to present its case but did not recall two
witnesses alleged by Fasanaro to have given exculpatory testimony at the first proceed-
ing. An indictment was returned. Fasanaro contended that not recalling the witnesses
or informing the grand jury of their prior testimony violated the Johnson rule. See
Petitioner's Brief in Reply to Supplemental Opposition to Petition for Writ of Prohibition
at 22, Fasanaro v. Superior Court, Civil No. 36843 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Oct. 30, 1975). The
government disputed the exculpatory nature of the previous testimony and noted that
the original 12 members had the right to recall the two witnesses. Johnson was further
distinguished by the government on the grounds that Fasanaro was permitted to volun-
tarily appear and explain "anything which he would like to convey to the grand jury."
Respondent's Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Petitions for Writs of Prohibition at
9, Fasanaro v. Superior Court, Civil No. 36843 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Oct. 30, 1975). Such
an appearance, argued the government, did not render the grand jury's right to receive
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involving the prosecutor's duty of disclosure. Second, the majority holding
does not provide a mechanism with which an unknowing subject of a grand
jury proceeding can reveal exculpatory evidence in his possession. The ruling
only applies to evidence in the possession of the district attorney. 'In
situations in which the prosecution initiates prosecution by indictment with-
out a previous preliminary hearing on the same charge, it is unlikely that the
prosecutor would be aware of exculpatory material which may be disclosed
by the accused. Third, the majority opinion reaffirmed the prosecutor's
right to engage in forum shopping by citing Uhlemann with approval. 88 Thus
the court recognized the right of the prosecutor to shop for a closed forum
after an earlier effort to prosecute on the same charge was dismissed by a
magistrate at an open forum. This practice may be "unnecessarily burden-
some . . . and may constitute harassment of an accused."8 9 For the court
to advance from the protection announced in Johnson, it should consider
Justice Mosk's arguments against the constitutionality of California's means
of finding sufficient cause. Two remedies that might be considered are to
limit the prosecutor's practice of forum shopping and to regard a grand jury
proceeding as a critical stage of the criminal process.
A. Limitation of Forum Shopping
A prosecutor may render meaningless the importance and judicial nature
of the preliminary hearing as recognized in Coleman by shopping for a
forum in which the strengths of the accused's defense and the weaknesses of
the state's case may never be fully disclosed. 90 A more equitable approach
would be to follow -the rule in Stone v. Hope in which an indictment was
returned after the information charging the same offense had been dismissed
at a preliminary hearing.91 Hope recognized that in Oklahoma a magis-
exculpatory evidence illusory. See id. at 8-9. The supreme court remanded the case to
the court of appeal which had rendered its denial of petitioner's writ prior to the supreme
court's ruling in Johnson. Preliminary arguments before the court of appeal were
scheduled on January 15, 1976. Telephone interview with Jean M. Bordon, Deputy
Attorney General of California, in Washington, D.C., December 17, 1975.
* 88. See note 73 & accompanying text supra.
89. Stone v. Hope, 488 P.2d 616, 620 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
90. "The primary reason the prosecutor engages in such a strategy is to prevent the
defense from gaining any discovery of his case. Before the grand jury he can secretly
obtain the assessment of laymen of the strength of his case without providing any
advantage to the defendant." Dash, supra note 64, at 813 n.26. See Graham &
Letwin, Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles: Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy
Observations, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 635, 735 (1971); Comment, The Preliminary
Hearing Versus the Grand Jury indictment: "Wasteful Nonsense of Criminal Jurispru-
dence" Revisited, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 825 (1974).
91. See notes 32, 33 & accompanying text supra.
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trate's ruling on the issue of sufficient cause is "final and binding" on other
magistrates or grand juries in the absence of additional evidence not
presented and unavailable at the preliminary hearing. In the absence of
such additional evidence, a returned indictment would be dismissed. 92 By
adopting the rule in Hope, the controlling points of Coleman and the due
process rights of an accused at a preliminary hearing would be given greater
weight at a grand jury inquiry held after an earlier dismissal of a state's
case.
93
B. Recognition of the Grand Jury Inquiry as a Critical Stage
Chief Justice Burger's acknowledgement in Coleman that a grand jury
inquiry is a "decidedly more 'critical'" stage of criminal procedure than an
optional preliminary hearing designed to determine whether sufficient evi-
dence exists to bring an accused before a grand jury94 should be adopted by
the California Supreme Court. While the Chief Justice made the assertion in
his dissent that the Constitution does not require the assistance of counsel at
a preliminary hearing, Coleman remains operative and its application to only
preliminary hearings contributes to the procedural disparity criticized by
Justice Mosk.95 The Court's justification for applying the sixth amendment
to the preliminary hearing96 is cogent evidence that it should be applied to a
grand jury inquiry whose function is identical to that of most preliminary
hearings-the determination of whether there is sufficient cause. If the
California court eventually agrees to deem the grand jury inquiry a critical
stage, the issue would become whether an accused should be afforded a
post-indictment hearing or additional procedural guarantees during the grand
jury proceeding. The latter provision would seem preferable. In the entire
American criminal justice system there are only two institutions which
require that adjudications be made by laymen: the petit and the grand juries.
92. 488 P.2d at 619-20.
93. In Uhlemann, the California Supreme Court was concerned with the magistrate's
determination of the case on the merits and ruled that the power of a magistrate is
limited to determining whether sufficient cause exists to hold defendant for trial. Since
a final judgment on the merits may not be issued by a magistrate, the court held there
was no bar to a subsequent prosecution. 9 Cal. 3d at 667-69, 511 P.2d at 610-13, 108
Cal. Rptr. at 659-61. It can be argued that the adoption by the California Supreme
Court of the rule in Hope would not disturb the ruling in Uhlemann. Rather, it would
affirm the rule that the magistrate's power is limited to deciding the issue of sufficient
cause. But the magistrate's decision, not rendered on the merits, would be binding in
subsequent attempts to find sufficient cause in the absence of additional evidence not
produced at the earlier proceeding.
94. See note 70 supra.
95. 15 Cal. 3d at 262, 539 P.2d at 801, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
96. See note 69 & accompanying text supra.
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One sponsor of the proposed Grand Jury Reform Act of 197597 believes that
it would be a mistake to minimize the role of the grand jury "at a time when
popular participation in our political and legal institutions needs to be
encouraged, not discouraged. s98 A grand jury proceeding with procedural
safeguards-assistance of counsel within the grand jury room and the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses-would make a post-indictment hearing
unnecessary and leave the final determination of the existence of probable
cause with the grand jurors.99 There are strong indications, however, that
the California Supreme Court is not anxious to consider these issues on
constitutional grounds. 100
IV. CONCLUSION
Johnson provides an accused with a new and important measure of
protection against prosecutorial excesses at the grand jury level of the
criminal process. In bolstering the capacity of a grand jury to render a more
objective and independent determination on the issue of sufficient cause, the
decision partially responds to recent criticism that the grand jury serves at
the pleasure of the prosecutor. The obligation now placed on a prosecutor
to affirmatively produce exculpatory evidence in his possession narrows the
wide gap which has developed between the right of a defendant to discover
at trial favorable material evidence and the few, if any, rights of an
individual who is the subject of an indicting grand jury proceeding. The
court seemed determined to fashion relief, hesitated from reaching too far,
and promulgated a reasonable rule by interpreting section 939.7 in a way
which runs counter to the court's previous guidelines on statutory construc-
tion. Whether Johnson will start a trend in other states will depend on the
97. H.R. 2986, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
98. 121 CONG. REC. E-487 (1975) (remarks of Representative Conyers).
99. There may be instances, particularly in cases involving government corruption
and organized crime, in which there is a compelling need for secrecy in order to protect
the identity and security of witnesses. In such a situation, a prosecutor should be
allowed to petition the trial court for an order to hold the grand jury proceeding ex parte
with the understanding that a post-indictment hearing will follow in the event an
indictment is returned.
100. In Fasanaro v. Superior Court, Civil No. 36843 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Oct. 30, 1975),
the court was directly faced with petitioner's contention that the prosecutor's failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence violated his right to due process. Counsel for Fasanaro at-
tempted to have the court expand Johnson by framing his chief arguments in constitu-
tional terms. See Petitioner's Reply Brief to Supplemental Opposition to Petition for
Writ of Prohibition at 2-3, Fasanaro v. Superior Court, Civil No. 36843 (Cal. Sup. Ct.,
Oct. 30, 1975). The court repeated its avoidance of the constitutional issues and
remanded Fasanaro to the court of appeal for consideration in light of Johnson.
It is apparent that for the time being the court seems content with the ground broken
in Johnson. See note 87 supra.
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degree of prosecutorial excesses in those other jurisdictions and the extent to
which tribunals desire to restrict such excesses by similarly interpreting their
comparable statutory provisions.
The constitutional objections raised by Justice Mosk should be considered
by the court and should form the basis for a subsequent ruling which would
lessen the differences between information and indictment procedures. The
court should limit forum shopping by requiring additional evidence in the
event of a reprosecution and should recognize that, in light of the logic of
Coleman, the grand jury deserves to be deemed a critical stage of the criminal
process. Notwithstanding the court's avoidance of the constitutional issues in
Johnson and Fasanaro, the presence of three justices who are concerned with
those constitutional aspects' 0 ' suggests that additional protection for an
accused can be expected from a jurisdiction which has greatly expanded an
accused's rights throughout the stages of the criminal process.
Eugene I. Goldman
SECURITIES LAW-Section 16(b)-Concept of Beneficial
Ownership Used to Broaden Insider Liability for Short-Swing
Profits. Whiting v. Dow Chemical Co., 523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.
1975).
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act' imposes liability on an
"insider ' 2 for profits gained through sales and purchases, or purchases and
sales, of his company's securities within a 6-month period. In an effort to
protect public investors from the use of nonpublic corporate information by
certain statutorily defined insiders, section 16(b) recaptures the profit from
any covered transaction without regard to whether or not the insider acted on
nonpublic information. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in Whiting v. Dow Chemical Co.,3 was faced with the question of
101. See note 65 supra.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
2. The definition of an insider is included in section 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)
(1970): "Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10
per centum of any class of any [registered, nonexempted] equity security . . .or who is
a director or an officer of the issuer of such security ... "
3. 523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975).
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whether formally separate sales and purchases of company stock by an
insider and his wife should be aggregated so as to fall within section 16(b).
The court's decision that these transactions are within the statute has opened
a potentially broad new area of section 16(b) coverage.
Appellant Macauley Whiting was a director of Dow Chemical Co. His
wife, a granddaughter of the founder of the company, had considerable
holdings in Dow stock. The Whitings' assets were formally segregated,
although their individual accounts were managed by the same financial
advisors, and their general investment philosophy was formulated jointly.4 In
late 1973, Mrs. Whiting, with the knowledge and approval of her husband,
decided to increase the rate of sale of her Dow stock. In accord with this
decision she sold a total of 29,770 shares in September and November 1973
at an average price of $55 to $56 per share. One month later, in December
1973, Mr. Whiting exercised an option to purchase 21,420 shares at a price
of approximately $24 per share.5  The financing for Mr. Whiting's purchase
was obtained through an intrafamily loan from his wife with funds which she
had received from her recent sales of Dow stock.6 After becoming aware
that he might be liable for profits garnered from the matching sales and
purchase, Mr. Whiting sought a declaratory judgment from the district court
that he was not liable under section 16(b). Dow counterclaimed for the
profits and, after trial, the district court awarded judgment for Dow.7
4. Id. at 682. There was considerable argument between the two parties concerning
the degree of control which Mr. Whiting exerted over his wife's investment policy. Dow
argued that over a 17-year period "Mr. Whiting ha[d] either himself selected, or ha[d]
exercised a controlling influence over the selection of" his wife's legal and finan-
cial advisers, and "ha[d] exercised a controlling influence over the management
and disposition of his wife's Dow securities." Brief for Appellee at 11, Whiting v. Dow
Chem. Co., 523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975). Plaintiff argued that Mrs. Whiting maintained
her financial independence by employing her own financial advisers who were not
controlled by her husband. Post-Trial Memorandum for Plaintiff at 10, Whiting v. Dow
Chem. Co., 386 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Plaintiff contended that "Mr. Whiting
neither had nor wanted control over Mrs. Whiting's Dow holdings." Brief for Appellant
at 7, Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975). The district court
resolved this issue of control in the plaintiff's favor, finding that Mrs. Whiting was not
the "alter-ego" of her husband. See p. 667 infra.
5. 523 F.2d at 682. The "recoverable" profit resulting from the matching sale and
purchase was in excess of $200,000.
6. Id. The fact that Mr. Whiting purchased the stock with the proceeds from his
wife's recent sales of Dow stock was probably the most damaging aspect of their case.
The appeals court believed that the loan was the connecting link between the sales and
purchase which the appellant argued so strenuously were separate and unrelated transac-
tions. Compare id. at 688 with Brief for Appellant at 3-4, Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co.,
523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975).
7. Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 386 F. Supp. 1130, 1138 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The
district court held that although the transaction did not clearly fall within the literal
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On appeal, the Second Circuit was particularly concerned with the facts as
established by the district court. Among these was the fact that both of the
Whitings were aware of, and had participated in, the decisions to execute the
sales and purchase in question.8 In addition, it was clear that the income
from Mrs. Whiting's stock was a significant factor in maintaining the family's
lifestyle, since she provided the funds to cover numerous expenses which
otherwise would have come from her husband's salary. 9 The lower court
had also found that Mrs. Whiting maintained her own financial records, that
she did not mingle her assets with her husband's, and that "there is no
evidence that he [Mr. Whiting] controls . . . even the general aspects of
the management of her estate." 10
The issue which the appeals court faced in Whiting was whether Mr. Whit-
ing had "realized profit" within the meaning of section 16(b) from the sales
and purchase in question, so as to make him liable for the profit under the
statute. The court held that since plaintiff was the "beneficial owner" of his
wife's stock for section 16(b) purposes, he did realize profit from the sales
and purchase and was liable to Dow for that amount."
I. DETERMINING THE BOUNDARIES OF SECTION 16(b)
Section 16(b) was included in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for
the specific purpose of protecting the investing public from speculation by
corporate insiders on the basis of information not available to the general
public.' 2 The common law remedy for abuse of inside information required
a showing of bad faith on the part of the insider. It was the difficulty of
meeting this burden which inspired the congressional view that a ban on
insider trading could only be effective if a showing of intent was not required
as a necessary element.' 3 The result is that section 16(b) imposes liability
language of section 16(b), the statute should be interpreted to cover this case since the
transaction at issue was susceptible to the kind of abuse which Congress sought to
prevent in passing section 16(b). Id. at 1135-36.
8. 523 F.2d at 688.
9. The court found that Mrs. Whiting's income was used to pay for the children's
education, the family's medical expenses, the maintenance of a vacation home, and the
payment of real estate taxes on the family home. Id. at 682.
10. 386 F. Supp. at 1132.
11. 523 F.2d at 688-89.
12. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934). See generally S. REP. No.
1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55-68 (1934), which relates specific examples of the kinds of
speculative abuse at which section 16(b) was aimed.
13. See Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
1006 (1967); Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 & 97 (73d Cong.)
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 6557
(1934) (testimony of Thomas Corcoran).
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for short-swing profits "irrespective of any intention" on the part of the
insider to hold the securities longer than six months,'14 and establishes a
conclusive presumption that inside information affected any trading that falls
within the boundaries of the section.
The provision for automatic liability has had a significant impact on
interpretations of the language of section 16(b) by the courts.' 5  Some
courts have inferred from the automatic liability provision that Congress
intended that the statute be applied in an entirely "objective" fashion;' that
is, if the transaction at issue fits within the literal terms of the statute, the
profits may be recovered. Other cases have taken a more flexible approach
to section 16(b) liability, particularly when the transaction involved is
"unorthodox"'17 or does not fall clearly within or without the statute.' 8 This
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
15. See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582,
595 (1973); Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 414 (1962); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528,
532 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,
136 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
16. The leading case expressing the various aspects of the "objective" approach is
Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965). The case involved a suit
against a director of Heli-Coil who converted company debentures into common stock
and then sold the stock within a 6-month period. The court held that the conversion of
debentures to common stock was a "purchase" of common stock within the meaning of
section 16(b), thus making the defendant liable for the profits arising from the
subsequent sale. Id. at 167. The court based its holding on the theory that Congress
intended the test of section 16(b) coverage to be "an entirely objective one" and did not
desire that courts delve into the individual character of each transaction. Id. at 164-67.
For other cases which have employed the objective approach, see Park & Tilford, Inc. v.
Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
17. So-called unorthodox transactions have been those which could not easily be
characterized as "purchases" or "sales" in a commercial sense and thus were not clearly
covered by the literal terms of section 16(b). See Gadsby & Treadway, Recent
Developments Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 N.Y.L.F.
687, 688 (1971). These unorthodox transactions have repeatedly arisen in a number of
specific situations. The first involves business mergers, and the question of whether the
exchange of stock in the merged company for stock in the merging company is a "sale"
of the former stock within the meaning of section 16(b). See, e.g., Kern County Land
Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973); Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc.,
425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970). A second common situation
involves the question of whether the execution of an option contract to buy or sell stock
constitutes a "purchase" or "sale" within the statute. See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., supra; Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971). A third common situation involves the
question of whether the conversion from preferred to common stock constitutes a
"purchase" of common stock within the meaning of section 16(b). See, e.g., Petteys v.
Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Blau v. Lamb,
363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Ferraiolo v. Newman,
259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
18. Borderline transactions other than those involving an interpretation of purchase
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flexible, "pragmatic" approach requires an initial determination of whether
the transaction at issue is of a type which affords the opportunity for the
kind of abuse which Congress sought to prevent in passing section 16(b).
This abuse is usually characterized as the realization of short-swing profits
on the basis of inside information.' -If the answer to this question is
affirmative, liability for short-swing profits will be imposed if the transaction
can fairly be covered by the statutory language.20
In two recent cases involving the question of section 16(b) coverage,
the Supreme Court has used both tests. In Reliance Electric Co. v.
Emerson Electric Co.,2 ' the Court declined to consider the intent behind
the transaction at issue or whether it might afford the opportunity for abuse
of an insider's position. 22  Refusing to impose liability, the Court reasoned
that the fact that the sales of stock had been specifically structured so as to
avoid liability was irrelevant since the sale did not fall within the literal
terms of the statute.2 3  In a later case, Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
and sale have presented such questions as whether a company or partnership can be held
liable for short-swing profits because the insider is alleged to be their "deputy" or agent.
See Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d
260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970). Another question which has
been raised is whether a director may be held liable for a short-swing transaction
occurring shortly after his retirement. See Lewis v. Varnes, 505 F.2d 785 (2d Cir.
1974).
19. For a concise statement of the pragmatic approach to section 16(b), see Ferraiolo
v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959). This
flexible approach has been followed by a number of other circuits as well. See Bershad
v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 697-98 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992
(1971); Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
854 (1970); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 536-37 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 1006 (1967); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 892 (1965). Although the Second Circuit in Whiting did not specifically
mention the pragmatic approach, it seems clear that the court was influenced by its basic
rationale. See p. 672 infra. The district court's decision in Whiting, on the other hand,
explicitly adopted the pragmatic approach. 386 F. Supp. at 1134-35.
20. See Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 992 (1971); Gadsby & Treadway, supra note 17, at 689.
21. 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
22. In an unsuccessful takeover bid, Emerson had acquired 13.2 percent of the
outstanding stock of Dodge Manufacturing Co., thereby qualifying Emerson as an insider
for purposes of section 16(b). See note 2 supra. When all hope of gaining control was
lost, Emerson sought to dispose of the stock within six months of acquisition with a
minimum liability under section 16(b). According to a preconceived plan, Emerson
made an initial sale of stock sufficient to reduce its holdings to 9.96 percent of outstand-
ing Dodge stock. Since the first sale brought it below the 10 percent ownership by
which an "insider" is defined, Emerson hoped that the profit arising from the subse-
quent sale of the remaining stock would not be covered by section 16(b).
23. The pertinent language of section 16(b) provides that "this subsection shall not
be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at
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Petroleum Corp.,24 the Court did look to the possibility for abuse in
determining whether either an insider's exchange of stock for that of an
acquiring company pursuant to a merger agreement or the insider's grant of
an option to buy back the shares so acquired constituted a "sale" within the
meaning of section 16(b) .2  The Court held that on the basis of the
involuntary nature of the exchange transaction and in the absence of any
possibility for abuse in both transactions, neither constituted a "sale" within
the statute, and the resulting profits were not recoverable. 26
The use of the pragmatic approach in Kern County was the culmination of
a trend toward that approach in the courts. 27 As a result of the increasing
occurrence of transactions such as those in Kern County, which defy easy
categorization under section 16(b), courts have been forced to adopt a more
flexible approach to determining liability under that section. 28  The prag-
matic approach is a manifestation of that flexibility.
The principal concept which must be explored in order to understand the
decision in Whiting is that of beneficial ownership. The term "beneficial
owner" occurs in a number of contexts in section 16,29 but it is not
specifically defined in that section. In two releases,30 the Securities and
the time of the purchase and sale . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). Justice Douglas,
dissenting, argued that insiders should not be permitted to so easily and effectively
circumvent the spirit of the statute. 404 U.S. at 427-28. For a further analysis of the
Court's holding, see Note, Reliance Electric and 16(b) Litigation: A Return to the Ob-
jective Approach, 58 VA. L. REV. 907 (1972).
24. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
25. The defendant became an insider when, in a takeover bid, it acquired greater than
10 percent of the stock of a company which avoided the takeover by merging with a
third company, Tenneco. The insider received Tenneco stock in exchange for its
holdings in the merged company and, within six months of its initial acquisition,
executed an option agreement with Tenneco for the latter to purchase the Tenneco stock
received; the option was not exercisable until six months and one day after the merger.
26. 411 U.S. at 600-01. For elaboration on the court's reasoning, see Deitz, A
Practical Look at Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 43 FORD. L. REV. 1, 25
(1974).
27. See Bateman, The Pragmatic Interpretation of Section 16(b) and the Need for
Clarification, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 772 (1971); Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New
Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 45, 45-46 (1968); Comment,
Section 16(b): Judicial Inconsistency in Application of the Pragmatic Approach, 5 TEX.
Tacn. L. REV. 731, 735-36 (1974). The Court in Kern County recognized that "[bly
far the greater weight of authority is to the effect that a 'pragmatic' approach to § 16(b)
will best serve the statutory goals." 411 U.S. at 594 n.26 (citations omitted).
28. See, e.g., cases cited notes 17 & 18 supra; Bateman, supra note 27, at 772.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970); Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 386 F. Supp. 1130, 1133-34
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
30. SEC Securities Act Release No. 7793 (Jan. 19, 1966), 3 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
26,031 at 19,057-3; SEC Securities Act Release No. 7824 (Feb. 14, 1966), 3 CCH FEa.
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Exchange Commission (SEC) has attempted to define the term as it relates
to securities held in the names of family members. The definition formulat-
ed by the SEC presumes that a person is the beneficial owner of securities
held in the name of a family member when he receives "benefits [from the
stock which are] substantially equivalent to ownership." 3' Beneficial own-
ership traditionally has been of primary importance in the determination of
which stocks must be reported under section 16(a). The SEC has distin-
guished between section 16(a) and section 16(b) in this context by stating
that stocks which are reported under section 16(a) are not necessarily
subject to section 16(b) liability.3 2
Prior to Whiting, the concept of beneficial ownership was used infrequent-
ly to bring a borderline transaction within the coverage of section 16(b). In
Marquette Cement Manufacturing Co. v. Andreas,33 the argument was made
that an insider realized profit from the short-swing transactions of a number
of family trusts. The court held the defendant liable for the profits made by
those trusts of which he was the beneficiary but not for those of which his
wife was the beneficiary. The question of whether the insider might have
benefited from profits accruing to the wife's trusts was answered in the
negative, largely because the insider's wife had "recognizably different
interests" 34 from his.
In a second case involving the question of beneficial ownership, Blau v.
Potter,35 the court simply assumed that if the insider were the beneficial
owner of his wife's stocks he would be liable for short-swing profits obtained
from their sale and purchase. 36 This assumption was dicta, however, since,
based on the facts of the case, the insider was not the beneficial owner of his
wife's stock.3 7
SEC. L. REP. T 26,030 at 19,057-2. See generally Shreve, Beneficial Ownership of
Securities Held by Family Members, 22 Bus. LAw. 431 (1967).
31. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7793 (Jan. 19, 1966), 3 CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 26,031 at 19,057-3. Such "benefits" might include the use of income
from securities for the maintenance of a common home or to meet expenses which would
otherwise be met from other sources. Id. See generally Feldman & Teberg, Beneficial
Ownership Under Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 WEST. RES. L.
REv. 1054 (1966).
32. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7824 (Feb. 14, 1966), 3 CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 26,030 at 19,057-2.
33. 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
34. Id. at 967. The insider and his wife were in fact divorced at the time of the
transaction in issue. The court felt that the "normal interest" of one family member in
another member's financial security was not a sufficient basis on which to hold that the
profits were "realized" by the insider. Id.
35. [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,115 (S.D.N.Y.).
36. Id. 94,115, at 94,477.
37. Id. 94,115, at 94,478; see note 48 infra.
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These cases, then, are of little aid in determining the degree to which the
concept of beneficial ownership might be combined with a flexible or
pragmatic interpretive approach to section 16(b) in order to expand the
section's coverage. Prior to Whiting, the issue had not been directly
addressed by the courts.38, The Second Circuit's analysis is thus helpful in
determining the potential scope of the broadened liability under section
16(b).
II. THE EXPANSION OF SECTION 16(b)
In Whiting, the court was initially faced with the fact that Dow was
alleging liability under section 16(b) despite the trial court's finding that Mr.
Whiting did not exercise exclusive control over his wife's stock transac-
tion.3 9  Although Whiting argued that liability was negated upon this
finding alone,40 the court refused to be so confined.41  By insisting on
looking behind what appeared at first glance to be separate transactions of
the insider and his wife, the court implicitly adopted the pragmatic approach
to section 16(b) liability.42 Had the court adopted the objective approach,
which requires that section 16(b) liability arises only when the transaction
fits the literal terms of the statute, 43 the court could have decided the case
on a narrower ground. Since the objective approach eschews an analysis of
the individual characteristics of the transaction at issue, 44 the Whiting court,
had it adopted that approach, could have refused to consider the possibilities
for abuse of inside information which the case presented. The court could
have simply held that the insider did not "realize" profit within the meaning
of section 16(b) because the profit from the sale of stock was not legally
his. 45  The court, however, did consider the character of the disputed
38. See 523 F.2d at 681, 684.
39. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
40. See Brief for Appellant at 10-20, Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 523 F.2d 680 (2d
Cir. 1975), in which it was argued that no prior case had attributed the transactions of
one person to another (the insider) without a showing that the insider controlled the
transaction. But see Brief for Appellee at 27-29, Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., supra.
41. The court insisted on viewing the totality of facts to determine "whether the other
indicia of [the Whitings'] relationship [were] sufficient to bring the transaction under
the rule of Section 16(b) .... ." 523 F.2d at 685.
42. Cf. text accompanying note 46 infra.
43. See generally p. 668 & note 16 supra.
44. See, e.g., Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972), in which
the Court refused to consider the possibility that the transactions at issue were specifical-
ly structured so as to avoid section 16(b) liability. Id. at 425. The fact that the
transaction was outside the literal terms of the statute was sufficient to negate liability.
Id. at 426-27.
45. But see Brief for Appellee at 229, Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 523 F.2d 680
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transactions, concluding that "to allow immunity here would open the door to
patent abuse which Congress sought to prevent .... *"46 The court based
this conclusion on the facts that Mr. Whiting obtained substantial benefits
from, and exercised significant control over, his wife's stock, making him a
"beneficial owner" of that stock. 47
The court's decision seems consonant with prior cases discussing the
issue. 48  When an insider is shown to have received significant monetary
benefits from his spouse's stock and when he appears to have substantial
influence over the disposition of that stock, he should be held to be. a
beneficial owner. 49 A person has been deemed not to be a beneficial owner,
however, when his control over the stock appears minimal or when he
enjoys no substantial benefits from the proceeds of the stock.50
In cases addressing the somewhat similar issue of whether a company can
be liable under section 16(b) because it has "deputized" an insider ofi
another company, the considerations of the courts have also been ones of
(2d Cir. 1975), in which Dow argued that the statutory language, "profit realized by him
from any purchase and sale," even read literally covers short-swing transactions involving
securities from which the insider receives benefits substantially equivalent to ownership.
Dow thus argued that the court could impose section 16(b) liability even under the
objective approach.
46. 523 F.2d at 689.
47. Id. at 688-89. The court specifically held that in order to be a beneficial owner,
one's control over the stock need not be exclusive, at least when the transactions
involving the stock were part of a common plan jointly managed by the insider and his
spouse. id.
48. See Blau v. Potter, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,115
(S.D.N.Y.) (insider was found not to be the beneficial owner of his wife's shares
because, among other things, she maintained her own brokerage accounts and kept her
funds segregated from his; the purchases in question were made entirely with her own
money, without any consultation with her husband; and none of the proceeds of
the stock went to pay household expenses); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239
F. Supp. 962, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (insider held not to be the beneficial owner of stock
held in trust for spouse because the trust was "bona fide and not revocable" by the
insider and because he and his wife had "recognizably different interests," id. at 967).
49. See Feldman & Teberg, supra note 31, at 1065. The authors suggest that
beneficial ownership should be found whenever a person in fact enjoys benefits from
another's stock. They suggest that it is not the enforceable right to the benefits which
beneficial ownership implies, but the actual enjoyment of such benefits. That the
Whiting court seems to have accepted this interpretation is implicit in its statement that
the case expands the concept of beneficial ownership beyond what it connotes in the law
of trusts. See 523 F.2d at 688. In its analogy to the law of trusts, the court seemed to
be referring to a concept more commonly referred to as beneficial interest, that is, a
"benefit, or advantage resulting from a contract, or the ownership of an estate as distinct
from the legal ownership or control." BLAcK's LAw DicTIONARY 199 (4th ed. 1968).
The term "beneficial owner" as used in Whiting connotes a more attenuated interest
than that which is traditionally meant by a beneficial interest. See also SEC Securities
Act Release No. 7793 (Jan. 19, 1966), 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 26,031 at 19,057-3.
50. See note 48 supra.
19761
Catholic University Law Review
control and influence. 51  When the insider exercised control over his
principal's investments sufficient to make it possible to profit from his
insider position, the company has been held liable under section 16(b).5 2
When it was clear that the insider was not consulted concerning his
principal's investments, section 16(b) liability has not been imposed. 53  In
all of these cases, the degree of participation by the insider in any disposition
of the stock and the degree to which he benefits from the stock proceeds are
the crucial issues in determining section 16(b) liability.
Benefit and control are also stated to be the important factors in the SEC's
definition of beneficial ownership; 4 the Whiting court relied heavily on that
definition in its analysis of the case. 55  After an extensive analysis to
determine that Mr. Whiting was a beneficial owner of his wife's stock, 56 the
court concluded that the determination was sufficient, in itself, to hold that
the profit from the sales of the stock was "realized by him" within the
meaning of section 16(b).17
The reliance on the concept of beneficial ownership in Whiting can be
criticized, however, on the ground that the concept, as defined by the SEC,
has traditionally been of primary importance in determining reporting re-
quirements under section 16(a).5 8 Its definition and development as a
concept have been influenced by the policy underlying that section, that is,
the requirement of comprehensive reporting of stock ownership. 9 The
policy of broad disclosure is served by an expansive interpretation of the
51. See cases cited note 18 supra.
52. See Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970) (deputy had ultimate responsibility for all Martin
Marietta's investments and had specifically approved the transactions in issue).
53. See Blau v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786, 788-89 (2d Cir. 1960), a! 'd, 368 U.S. 403
(1962) (alleged deputy had no responsibility for Lehman's investments and had not been
consulted concerning the specific transaction at issue).
54. See note 31 & accompanying text supra. The SEC has suggested that one of
the "benefits" which a beneficial owner derives is the ability to control "the purchase,
sale, or voting of such securities." SEC Securities Act Release No. 7793 (Jan. 19,
1966), 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 26,031 at 19,057-3.
55. See 523 F.2d at 686-88.
56. Id. at 687-89.
57. "The whole profit is 'his' profit, 'realized by him' because the shares are 'his' by
the statutory 'beneficial owner' concept as applied ...... 523 F.2d at 689.
58. See p. 671 supra.
59. Cf. Feldman & Teberg, supra note 31, at 1060-66. The authors note that section
16(a) was intended to curtail stock fraud and manipulation by exposing many stock
transactions to public view. Id. at 1096. The theory was that such transactions thrived
on secrecy and would be substantially discontinued if publicized. See generally Cook &




statutory term "beneficial owner," so as to make its coverage as extensive as
possible.
The difference in policy between sections 16(a) and 16(b) seems appar-
ent. While section 16(a) was intended to be a broad, comprehensive
provision, section 16(b) was directed at an isolated, narrowly defined
offense which Congress judged to be unfair. Insider trading was not banned
by a broad sweep, but was to be discouraged only in the narrow context in
which Congress believed it to be most offensive.60 The refusal of the SEC
to make the section 16(a) reporting requirements and section 16(b) liability
coextensive is rationally based on the differing policies of the two provisions.
The use by the Whiting court of the concept of beneficial ownership does not
give full recognition to this difference.
III. CONCLUSION
-By combining the concept of beneficial ownership with a flexible, prag-
matic approach to the language of section 16(b), the Second Circuit in
Whiting expanded the coverage of that section. The real significance of the
case lies in two aspects of the court's analysis. The first is the court's
rejection of the theory that an insider must have exclusive control over the
transaction at issue in order to be held liable for profits under section
16(b). 61 The court believed it was sufficient to show "joint control," at
least when the parties involved were husband and wife.6 2
The second important aspect of the case is the court's use of the concept of
beneficial ownership as developed under section 16(a) to impose liability
under section 16(b). The concept was used to link the insider with stock to
which he did not hold legal title. The use of the concept of beneficial
ownership in this fashion expands its importance beyond what it was
originally intended to be, that is, an additional reporting requirement under
section 16(a). It also may lend support to other attempts to establish
section 16(b) liability when the insider does not hold legal title to the stocks
involved.6 3
60. Courts and commentators have repeatedly stressed that in passing section 16(b),
Congress intended to discourage only that insider trading which produced profit from
matching sales and purchases occurring within six months of each other. See Reliance
Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972); Lewis v. Vames, 505 F.2d
785, 787-88 (2d Cir. 1974); 2 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1040-44 (2d ed. 1961).
61. 523 F.2d at 688-89.
62. Id. at 688.
63. The theory of deputization, for example, may be indirectly strengthened through
the reasoning of Whiting. See generally note 18 supra.
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It is clear from previous cases involving section 16(b) and from Whiting
that the nature of the transaction at issue is crucial.6 4 The characteristics of
the transaction determine whether it is clearly within or without the statute.
It is only when the transaction does not fit easily into one or the other area
that the courts must be flexible in interpreting the statutory language. By
the use of this flexible approach and the concept of beneficial ownership in
Whiting, the court has increased the uncertainty and unpredictability of
section 16(b) coverage.0 5
Stephen R. Lohman
64. The importance of the particular facts in Whiting can be appreciated by recogniz-
ing the careful and extensive consideration which the court gave to the facts as
established by the district court. See 523 F.2d at 682-84. A comparison of cases which
fall clearly outside the statute and those which are "borderline" illustrates the greater
importance placed on the characteristics of the transaction in the latter cases. Compare
Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972) with Kern County Land
Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
65. The Whiting court recognized the irony of this need for flexibility and the
importance of the particular characteristics of the transaction at issue in applying a
statute which was intended by Congress to be "simple and arbitrary in its application
... " 523 F.2d at 687. Other cases and commentators have similarly criticized the
pragmatic approach on the ground that it makes application of the statute unpredictable
and uncertain. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S.
582, 612 (1973) (Douglas, Brennan & White, JJ., dissenting); Petteys v. Butler, 367
F.2d 528, 538 (8th Cir. 1966) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Bateman, supra note 27, at
773; Deitz, supra note 26, at 37-38.
